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THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE":
EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT'S ADMINISTRATIVE
EXEMPTION
By Blake R. Bertagna*

ABSTRACT

Judge Richard Posner recently opined that the Fair Labor Standards
Act's administrative exemption is "pretty vague." Judge Posner's
observation is a gross understatement. Indeed, federal courts have been
grappling with this exemption's meaning since its creation in 1938. The
confusion surrounding the administrative exemption is baffling given
that it has existed for nearly seventy-five years, has been the object of
numerous regulatory revisions by the Department of Labor, and is
probably the most litigated of the Act's many exemptions.
Both Congress and the Department of Labor are responsible for
immortalizing the administrative exemption's perplexity. Congress
instigated the confusion by labeling two separate exemptions with
virtually synonymous terms-"executive" and "administrative." The
Department of Labor then cemented the entanglement of these two
exemptions by qualifying as administrative employees those whose
primary duty is "directly related to management."
The Department of Labor further broadened the administrative
exemption by extending its scope to employees whose primary duty is
related to "general business operations." Such language is so vague that
there is little surprise that the exemption's architect viewed the
exemption as broadly covering "persons performing a variety of
miscellaneous ... functions."

The administrative exemption's boundaries will be tested with even
more frequency in America's ailing economy. As wages stagger and
budgets constrict, employees and employers are likely to search for ways

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

to exploit the obscurity of the administrative exemption. And the
judiciary is likely to continue its longstanding battle of identifying the
boundaries of this elusive exemption, unless action is taken to rethink its
purpose and limits.
I.

INTRODUCTION

America is currently mired in "the worst economic crisis since the
Great Depression."' The federal government has responded with efforts
such as an $830 billion stimulus package, corporate bailouts, the "Cash
for Clunkers" program, and first-time homebuyer tax credits, which have
ignited temporary sparks of economic recovery.2 Yet, companies persist
in downsizing, wages remain stagnant, foreclosures continue to amass,
and the American Dream is increasingly fleeting.3
On September 9, 2011, President Barack Obama addressed a joint
session of Congress to propose steps to relieve the nation's economic
woes. His plan focused on remedying the plight of the country's
In his address, President Obama urged Congress to
jobless.4
immediately enact his American Jobs Act, a $447 billion jobs plan
aimed at growing the economy in 2012. 5
The parallels between America's current crisis and the Great
* Blake R. Bertagna is an associate in the Employment Law Department of the San Diego Office of

Paul Hastings LLP. The opinions expressed in this article are his own, and do not reflect the
opinions of Paul Hastings LLP. The author would like to thank Mary Dollarhide and Kirby Wilcox
for their guidance with this article. He would also like to thank Ken Kuykendall for his comments.
1. Christi Parsons & Peter Nicholas, Obama's Recent Speeches Stick to Theme: Economy, CHI.
TRm., Aug. 31, 2011, at C15 (quoting President Obama).
WALL
ST.
J,, Sept.
9,
2011,
2. The
Latest
Jobs
Plan,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424053111904836104576558931723540102.html.
3. Michael A. Fletcher, Many in U.S. Slip from Middle Class, Study Finds, WASH. POST,
Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/many-in-us-slip-from-middleclass-study-finds/2011/09/06/gIQA76ut7J-story.html; Joe Light, Memo to Staff: Don't Panic,
Aug.
15,
2011,
ST.
J.,
WALL
At the
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576504750371274700.html.
end of September 2011, unemployment remained over nine percent. Motoko Rich, Adding Jobs,
but Not Many, U.S. Economy Seems to Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/business/economy/us-adds-103000-jobs-rate-steady-at-9I .html?pagewanted=all. That same month, the Census Bureau reported that 46.2 million Americans
are living in poverty, the highest number in the 52 years that the Census Bureau has recorded that
statistic. Sabrina Tavemise, Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on 'Lost Decade', N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/14census.html?pagewanted=all.
4. Mark Landler, Obama Challenges Congress on Job Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/us/politics/09payroll.html?pagewanted=all.
5. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Economists on Obama Jobs Plan: Something's Missing, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2011, at A12.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/6

2

Bertagna: The "Miscellaneous Employee": Exploring the Boundaries of the Fai

2012]

THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE"

Depression are striking.6 In the spring of 1937, the federal government
was similarly searching for ways to relieve America's economic turmoil
and improve the lot of America's working force. With the Great
Depression's grip firmly around the nation's throat, a full third of
America's wage earners found themselves without work, and many more
faced the imminent demise of their livelihood. 7 On May 24th of that
year, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stood before a joint session of
Congress with a special message, proclaiming that the time had arrived
for the nation's leaders to take control of America's financial crisis by
guaranteeing America's "able-bodied
working men and women a fair
8
work.",
day's
fair
a
for
pay
day's
Congress responded with "one of the most bitterly fought pieces of
legislation ever to be enacted"-the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA" or "Act"). 9 After signing the FLSA, the President opined:
"[e]xcept for the Social Security Act, [the FLSA] is the most farreaching, far-sighted program ever adopted here or in any [other]
country."' 1
Despite FDR's rhetoric, the FLSA was never intended to be farreaching and far-sighted for everyone. From the moment the FLSA
became the law of the land, a significant number of Americans were
ineligible to receive its minimum wage and overtime protections, falling
within one or more of the FLSA's "exemptions."" And no group of
exemptions would become more numerous and significant than the soin "a bona fide
called "white-collar" exemptions-those employed
12
executive, administrative, or professional capacity.'
In 2003, the Wage and Hour Division ("WHD"), the agency tasked
with defining the white-collar exemptions, revisited the existing white-

6. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Aftershock to Economy Has a Precedent that Holds Lessons,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/business/financial-aftershockswith-precedent-in-history.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the parallels between the current crisis
and the events of 1937-38, "the so-called recession within the Depression").
7. According to one author, it was a time when "collapse was in the air." IRVING
BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER: 1920-1933, at 312 (1960).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 101-260, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 696-97.
9. John S. Forsythe, Note, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 464,474 (1939).

10. Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 105
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
11. See generally Forsythe, supra note 9, at 485 (describing the numerous exceptions carved
out by the FLSA).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
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collar regulations.' 3 It ultimately concluded that the FLSA's wage-andhour protections had "been severely eroded... because the Department
of Labor ha[d] not updated the regulations defining and delimiting the
exemptions for 'white collar' executive, administrative, and professional
employees.' 14 The WHD, in particular, singled out the "administrative
exemption" for revision, as the exemption had "generated significant
confusion and litigation"
and "provid[ed] little guidance for jobs of the
' 5
21st Century."'
Despite the agency's honorable intentions to clarify and restore
meaning to the administrative exemption, the confusion and litigation
persist today. More than seven years have passed since the Department
of Labor ("DOL") set out to bring clarity to the administrative
exemption. Yet even judicial luminary Judge Richard Posner recently
characterized the administrative exemption as "pretty vague."' 6 At
bottom, the administrative exemption is unworkable and demands
intervention.
This Article seeks to explain the nature of the administrative
exemption's defectiveness. Part II highlights key events in the creation
and development of the administrative exemption. Parts III and IV
identify two sources for the unworkability of the administrative
exemption. Part III argues that Congress and the DOL doomed the
administrative exemption by effectively creating an exemption that was
linguistically fused with the executive exemption. Part IV contends that
the regulatory language crafted by the DOL to define the administrative
exemption is so ambiguous that it has permitted the exemption to grow
virtually unlimited in its scope, inhibiting its application to a defined set
of employees. By uncovering the deep-seated flaws that have belied the
administrative exemption's effectiveness since its creation, the Article
has an objective of informing practitioners of the risks involved with
staking litigation in this exemption and of motivating jurists and
13. The FLSA created within the Department of Labor a new agency called the Wage and
Hour Division, to be directed by a single Administrator who would be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
718, § 4(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1061. On July 15, 1938, President Roosevelt appointed Elmer Andrews,
an engineer who had previously directed the New York Industrial Commission (i.e., New York's
labor department), as the first Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. Deborah C. Malamud,
Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MiCH. L.

REV. 2212, 2292 (1998).
14. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 541).
15. Id.at 22,122 and 22,139.
16. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2011).
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legislators to call for a comprehensive overhaul of the administrative
exemption.
II. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

On May 24, 1937, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama and
Representative William Connery of Massachusetts introduced bills S.
2475 and H.R. 7200, respectively. 7 President Roosevelt concurrently
delivered a special message to Congress. The President reminded
legislators that "[o]ne third of our population ... is ill-nourished, illclad, and ill-housed. 1 8 He expressed his "hope" that Congress would
immediately enact legislation "to help those who toil in factory and on
farm."' 9 To that end, he insisted on a bill that would "define a general
maximum working week," "put some floor below which the wage ought
not to fall," and "rul[e] out the products of the labor of children from any
fair market., 20 He urged lawmakers to action, closing with, "We cannot
stand still."'2' Thirteen months later, on June 25, 1938, President
Roosevelt signed the Fair Labor Standards Act into law.22
A. Exemptions
The 75th Congress never intended to extend wage-and-hour
Section 13 of the FLSA, entitled
protection to all workers.23
"Exemptions," stated that "[t]he provisions of sections 6 [covering
minimum wages] and 7 [covering overtime] shall not apply with respect
to... any employee employed 24in a bona fide executive, administrative,
[or] professional... capacity.,

17. Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The FairLabor Standards Act of 1938, 53 POL.
SC. Q. 491,493 (1938).
18. 81 CONG. REc. H4983 (daily ed. May 24, 1937) (statement of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 473. For a discussion of the issues that prolonged the
enactment of the FLSA, see infra pp. 506-13.
23. Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2009); see also Brooklyn
Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945) ("The legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards
Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the
free flow of goods in interstate commerce") (emphasis added).
24. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, § 13(a)(1), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067.
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Congress "'shr[a]nk from defining ' ' 21 the meaning of the whitecollar exemptions. Congress shifted this responsibility to the Wage and
Hour Administrator.2 6 On October 20, 1938, only days before the
FLSA's effective date, the WHD published its regulations defining and
delimiting the white-collar exemptions. 27
Congress's statutory language appeared to have distinguished
between employees working in an executive and administrative capacity.
The Wage and Hour Administrator, however, did not construe the
statutory language in such a manner. In its first set of regulations, it
defined the terms "executive" and "administrative" in combination with
one another.28
The term "employee employed in a bona fide executive [and]
administrative... capacity" in Section 13 (a)(1) of the Act shall mean
any employee whose primary duty is the management of the
establishment, or a customarily recognized department thereof, in
which he is employed, and who customarily and regularly directs the
work of other employees therein, and who has the authority to hire and
fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to
the hiring and firing and as to the advancement and promotion or any
other change of status of other employees will be given particular
weight, and who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary
powers, and who does no substantial amount of work of the same
nature as that performed by nonexempt employees of the employer,
and who is compensated for his services at not less than $30 (exclusive
of board, lodging, or other facilities) for a workweek. 29
The failure to separately define "executive" and "administrative"
shortly became the subject of intense criticism.3 °

25.
MARC LINDER, "TIME AND A HALF'S THE AMERICAN WAY": A HISTORY OF THE
EXCLUSION OF WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS FROM OVERTIME REGULATION, 1868-2004, at 398
(2004) (quoting Bagnall v. Levenstein, Ltd., 1 K.B. 531, 542 (1906) (bracket in original).
26. § 13(a)(1), 52 Stat. at 1067 ("as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of
the Administrator").
27.
See Regulations Defining and Delimiting the Terms "Any Employee Employed in a Bona

Fide Executive, Administrative, Professional, or Local Retailing Capacity or in the Capacity of
Outside Salesman" Pursuant to Section 13 (A) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 3 Fed. Reg.
2515, 2518 (Oct. 20, 1938).

28.
29.

Id.
Id. (emphases added).

30. HAROLD STEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR Div., "EXECUTIVE,
ADMINISTRATIVE, PROFESSIONAL... OUTSIDE SALESMAN" REDEFINED 3 (1940) [hereinafter "Stein

Report"].
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B. Stein Report
After the issuance of the October 1938 regulations, the WHD
stayed in close contact with "interested employers, employees, trade
associations, and unions concerning the propriety of the definitions and
These communications ultimately
their correct interpretation. 31
signaled that revisions to the regulations were necessary. As a result, the
agency conducted fourteen days of public hearings in Washington D.C.
from April 10 to June 29, 1940 to "allow all interested parties to express
their views on the regulations and to propose amendments. 32
Harold Stein, Assistant Director of the WHD's Hearings Branch,
presided over the regulatory hearings.33 Stein heard testimony from over
160 different parties, producing a hearing transcript stretching 2,216
pages.34 In addition to the testimonies, the WHD received nearly 180
written submissions.35 Many points emerged from the mountain of data,
but no criticism was "so frequently repeated as that the Administrator
erred in not making separate definitions of the two words 'executive'
and 'administrative.,,' 36 All the evidence presented during and in
connection with the hearings resulted in a "widely disseminated Report
and Recommendation," generally known as the "Stein Report," which
included the WHD's proposed amended regulations.3 7
In his Report and Recommendation, Stein answered the criticisms
in a
combined
definition that
resulted
of the
1938
Stein concluded that "the
executive/administrative exemption.
regulations will be more easily understood and administered if a separate
definition and delimitation is adopted for the term 'administrative."' 3 8
Accordingly, in 1940, the WHD proposed separate definitions for the
two exemptions. The newly minted executive exemption pertained to
individuals:
(a) whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized
department or subdivision thereof, and

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1.
Id.
LINDER, supra note 25, at 539.
Id. at 538.
Id
Stein Report, supranote 30, at 3.
Malamud, supra note 13, at 2304.
Stein Report, supranote 30, at 5.
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(b) who customarily and regularly directs the work of other employees
therein, and
(c) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose
suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to
the advancement and promotion or any other change of status of other
employees will be given particular weight, and
(d) who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers, and
(e) who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at not less
than $30 per week (exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities), and
(f) whose hours of work of the same nature as that performed by
nonexempt employees do not exceed 20 percent of the number of
hours worked in the workweek by the nonexempt employees under his
direction: Provided, That this paragraph shall not apply in the case of
an employee who is in sole charge of an independent
establishment or
39
a physically separated branch establishment.
The new executive exemption largely tracked the 1938 combined
executive/administrative definition. Aside from the addition of language
providing a ceiling of twenty percent on the amount of nonexempt work
that an exempt employee could perform, the language was nearly
identical.
The newly crafted administrative exemption, however, bore little
resemblance to its 1938 predecessor. In fact, the WHD created an
entirely new definition for the administrative exemption. Under the new
definition, an administrative exempt worker was one:
(a) who is compensated for his services on a salary or fee basis at a rate
of not less than $200 per month (exclusive of board, lodging, or other
facilities), and
(b) (1)who regularly and directly assists an employee employed in a
bona fide executive or administrative capacity (as such terms are
defined in [these] regulations ... ), where such assistance is nonmanual
in nature and requires the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment; or
(2) who performs under
39.

only

general

supervision,

responsible

29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1941).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/6

8

Bertagna: The "Miscellaneous Employee": Exploring the Boundaries of the Fai

2012]

THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE"

nonmanual office or field work, directly related to management
policies or general business operations, along specialized or technical
lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge, and which

requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; or
(3) whose work involves the execution under only general supervision
of special nonmanual assignments and tasks directly related to
management policies or general business operations
involving the
40

exercise of discretion and independent judgment.

The stand-alone definitions thus made clear that by joining the
executive and administrative exemptions into a single definition in 1938,
the Wage and Hour Division had essentially jettisoned the administrative
exemption as an independent exemption, distinct from the executive
exemption.
The 1940 regulations would undergo substantive revisions nearly a
decade later.4 1 Nonetheless, with the language that Harold Stein crafted,
he constructed the structural framework for the white-collar exemptions
that remains today. Indeed, Professor Marc Linder has observed, Stein's
"most enduring accomplishment at the WHD" was "his single-handed
re-creation of the white-collar overtime regulations. 42
C. Weiss Report
The passage of time, unsurprisingly, required revisiting the
adequacy of the 1940 regulations. Following the end of World War II,
in 1947, the Wage and Hour Administrator realized that "changes in
economic circumstances" called for the WHD to re-evaluate the whitecollar exemptions.43 As a result, on December 2, 1947, the WHD began
a stretch of twenty-two days of hearings, which involved over 100
witnesses and 140 written submissions. 44 Harry Weiss, who was
director of the Research and Statistics Branch of the WHD, presided
over the hearings.45 His goal would be to identify revisions that needed
to be made in light of the then current U.S. economy.

40.
41.

29C.F.R. § 541.2.
See infra pp. 494-96.

42.

LINDER, supranote 25, at 531.

43.
44.

Id. at 752.

HARRY WEISS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR & PUB. CONTRACTS Div., REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS OF REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 2 (1949)
[hereinafter "Weiss Report"].
45.
LINDER, supranote 25, at 752.
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The key focus of the hearings was the adequacy of the "salary test"
for the white-collar exemptions. Harry Weiss heard a vast range of
proposals, from making salary the exclusive test for exempt status, to
eliminating the salary requirements altogether.4 6 Weiss could not agree
with the latter position, believing that payment of a fixed salary
constituted "a vital element of the regulations. 4 7 He did agree,
however, that the salary levels used for the test had become "too low...
to serve their purpose fully" and needed to be elevated "to more realistic
figures. 'A 8 Consequently, he concluded that for the administrative
exemption, a salary level of $75 per week (the equivalent of $300 a
month) was "necessary to restore the salary tests to approximately the
same effectiveness that they had in October 1940"-a fifty percent
increase from the 1940 levels.49
Although Weiss rebuffed the proposal to make salary the sole
requirement for exempt status, to some extent, he did make a concession
to this position with the "Special Provisos for High Salaried Executive,
Administrative, or Professional Employees"'5 0- Weiss's "chief
innovation" of the 1949 regulations.5 1 Under this shortcut, "persons who
eam[ed] salaries of $100 a week or more and who ha[d] as their primary
duty the performance of work which is characteristic of employment in a
bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity" would be
exempt.52 Weiss deemed this "short test" for highly compensated
employees to be appropriate based upon the WHD's determination that
"[a]t the higher salary levels ... the employees have almost invariably
been found to meet all the other duties requirements of the regulations
for exemption. 53
Finally, Weiss created the "primary duties" test for the
administrative exemption. In reality, Weiss's role related more to
reorganization than drafting. The 1940 definition, which had grown out
of the Stein Report, had required an administrative employee to perform
work in one of three categories. Weiss essentially pulled out language

46. Weiss Report, supranote 44, at 6.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Id. at 8, 10.
49. Id. at 20-21.
50. Id. at 22-24.
51. LINDER, supranote 25, at 773.
52. Weiss Report, supra note 44, at 23.
53. Id. at 22. In time, the courts would routinely refer to and analyze FLSA exempt status
under the short and long tests. See, e.g., Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir.
2004) ("The Department of Labor (DOL) has established both a 'short' and a 'long' duties test to
determine whether someone is an exempt administrative employee").
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from those three preexisting categories (but still maintaining those three
disjunctive areas of work) and organized them into separate elements of
the primary duties test. The first element required the employee's
primary duty to involve "office or nonmanual field work., 54 The next
element required the employee's primary duty to be "directly related to
management policies or general business operations.""
The third
element required the employee's primary duty to involve "the exercise
of discretion and independent judgment., 56
The administrative
exemption adopted by the Department of Labor in 1949 applied to
workers:
whose primary duty consists of the performance of office or
nonmanual field work directly related to management policies or
general business operations of his employer or his employer's
customers; and
who customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent
judgment; and
(C)(1) who regularly and directly assists a proprietor, or an employee
employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity (as such
terms are defined in these regulations), or
(2) who performs under only general supervision work along
specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience or
knowledge, or
(3) who executes under only general supervision special assignments
and tasks; and
(D) who does not devote more than 20 percent of his hours worked in
the workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to
the performance of the work described in subsections (A) through (C)
above; and
(E) who is compensated for his services on a salary or fee basis at a
rate of not less than $75 per week (or $200 per month if employed in
Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands) exclusive of board, lodging, or other

54. Weiss Report, supra note 44, at 59-61.

55.
56.

Id. at 61-65.
Id.at 65-70.
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facilities;

Provided, That an employee who is compensated on a salary or fee
basis at a rate of not les than $100 per week (exclusive of board,
lodging, or other facilities) and whose primary duty consists the
performance of office or nonmanual field work directly related to

management policies or general business operations of his employer of
his employer's customers, which includes work requiring the exercise
of discretion and independent judgment,
shall be deemed to meet all of
57
the requirements of this section.

Almost sixty-five years would pass before the DOL made any
substantive revisions to how exempt status was determined under the
regulations.58
D. The 2004 Regulations
By the late 1990s, tectonic shifts in America's economy had created
an overt need to revisit the FSLA's white-collar exemptions. In 1999,
the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") observed that "the
industrial profile of the American economy ha[d] shifted dramatically"
since the FLSA's enactment, requiring revision of the outdated
regulations, and in particular, those treating the white-collar
59
exemptions.
At the heart of this shift was the burgeoning service sector, which
had become the largest employment sector in the U.S. economy,
employing one-quarter of all full-time employees in 1998.60 In the
preceding fifteen years, the service sector had added 11 million
additional employees, 3.6 million of which qualified as exempt whitecollar employees. 6 1 Due to the failure of the regulations to keep pace
with the evolving American economy, the GAO concluded that the DOL
57. Id. In 1942, the WHD amended the administrative exemption by adding subsection
(b)(4), an exemption for "pilots, copilots and navigators who were engaged in ferrying aircraft from
the United States to points outside the country." Id. at 70. By 1949, the justifications for
implementing that exemption had disappeared, and the exemption was removed. Id.
58. Between 1949 and 2004, the regulations underwent two types of revisions. One
increased the salary level for white-collar employees, which occurred in 1958, 1963, 1970, and
1975. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, WHITE-COLLAR ExEMPTiONs

INTHE MODERN WORK PLACE 15 (1999). The other category expanded or minimized the coverage
for certain kinds of employees, namely retail workers in 1961, teachers in 1967, and computer
professionals and govemment employees in 1992. Id.
59. ld. at 1.
60. Id. at 2, 9.
61. Id.at8-10.
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had done little to "alleviate the general problems" with the white-collar
exemptions and that it had become "important to readjust these tests to
meet the needs of the modem work place. 62
A few years following the GAO's report, the DOL was ready to act.
Labor Secretary Elaine L. Chao herself characterized the white-collar
exemptions as "literally ancient" and "absurdly complex., 63 A WHD
official similarly observed that the "regulations no longer reflect[ed] the
they [we]re
contemporary workplace, that they [we]re outdated, that
64
them."
in
titles
job
obsolete
ha[d]
they
that
complicated,
As additional fuel to the fire, in the years following the GAO
Report and prior to the DOL's new regulations, the courts witnessed a
virtual "tidal wave of class-action lawsuits charging employers with
White-collar employees were
robbing them of overtime.,,65
"transforming hundreds of nickel-and-dime wage claims into
multimillion-dollar assaults on corporations., 66 Blue-chip employers,
such as Rite Aid, 67 U-Haul, 68 Starbucks, 69 Bank of America, 70 and
62. Id. at 34-35.
63. LINDER, supra note 25, at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Maria M. Perotin, Unchartered Territory; Gray Area of Overtime Qualifications Could
Mean More Lawsuits, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 4, 2002, at 16 (statement by Eric
Dreiband, deputy administrator for the U.S. Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division). Many
beyond the DOL recognized the inadequacy of the regulations on the white-collar exemptions. See,
e.g., Samuel D. Walker, Overtime Overhaul Overdue, N.J. L.J. 83, 84-85 (June 12, 1998)
(characterizing the considerations in determining whether an employee is exempt under the whitecollar exemptions as "subjective and sometimes downright murky," and recommending that the
duties and salary basis tests be removed for those earning a "relatively high compensation level");
Peter S. Rukin, Representing Workers Under the FairLabor Standards Act and Illinois Minimum
Wage Law, 87 ILL. B.J. 208, 209 (1999) ("Determining the applicability of the 'white collar'
exemption can be difficult for even the most experienced practitioner"); Daniel V. Yager & Sandra
J. Boyd, Reinventing the Fair Labor Standards Act to Support the Reengineered Workplace, 11
LAB. LAW. 321, 331 (1996) ("Few, if any, areas of employment law have proven themselves less
adaptable to an evolving work force than the so-called white-collar exemption to the FLSA");
Robert D. Lipman et al., A Call for Bright-Lines to Fix the FairLabor StandardsAct, 11 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 361-62 (1994) ("Despite the expenditure of these resources, however, the test
to determine which administrative, executive and professional workers may be exempt from the
maximum hours standard is not clear.... This is an onerous and burdensome, if not impossible,
job"); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Labor Dept. to Propose New Overtime-Pay Rules, WASH. POST,
Mar. 27, 2003, at E01 (noting business groups' criticism of regulations as "antiquated and geared
toward a manufacturing-based economy rather than one that is based on information and
technology").
65. Lisa Girion, InfuriatedManagers Suing for Overtime-and Winning, L.A. TIMES, June 8,
2001, at Al.
66. Id.
67. Rite Aid settled for $25 million. Id.
68. U-Haul settled for $7.5 million. Id.
69. Starbucks settled for $18 million. Kirstin Downey, Overtime-Pay Complaints End Up in
CourtMore Often, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2004, at D 12.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

RadioShack 7' were losing money by the millions.72 For this reason, in
January 2004, Secretary Chao, testifying before a Senate hearing on the
need to revise the regulations, stated that the "needless litigation"
generated from the antiquated rules was costing companies nearly $2
billion a year.73
Words turned into action on March 31, 2003, when the Department
of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and its proposed
revisions.74 In the Notice, the DOL immediately acknowledged that the
"exemptions [had] engendered considerable confusion over the years
regarding who is, and who is not, exempt., 75 Unsurprisingly, the 75,280
comments that the DOL received during the ninety-day comment period
"revealed significant misunderstandings regarding the scope of the
'white collar' exemptions., 76 As a result, the DOL hoped to "simplify,
clarify, and better organize the regulations defining and delimiting" the
white-collar exemptions with the goal of "enhanc[ing] understanding of
the boundaries and demarcations of the exemptions." 77 To that end, the
DOL made two conspicuous changes to the administrative exemption.
First, it eliminated the short and long tests. Under the existing
framework at the time, the exempt status of employees earning a salary
of $155 and $250 per week had been analyzed under a more rigorous
test than those earning above $250 per week.78 The DOL determined
that the complexity of the regulations would be reduced by "replacing
the subjective and effectively79 dormant 'long' test requirements" with a
"single standard duties test.",

70. Bank of America settled for $4.1 million. Id.
71. RadioShack settled for $29.9 million. Shirleen Holt, Bank to Write Overtime Checks: $4
Million Ends Suit by Staff Working Off Clock, SEATTLE TIMES, May 2, 2003,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20030502&slug=bofa02.
72. In one of the starkest examples, a jury in California awarded a $90 million verdict to
Farmers Insurance Exchange claims adjusters in a lawsuit alleging that Farmers had misclassified
claims adjustors as exempt managers. Id.
73.

Mark Wilson, Omnibus Spending Bill ProvisionsPt. I.- New Overtime Law to End Payfor

Up
to
8
Million
Workers,
DEMOCRACY
Now
(Jan.
22,
2004),
http://www.democracynow.org/2004/1/22/omnibus spending billprovisions pt_i.
74. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,560 (proposed Mar. 31, 2003) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
75. Id.
76. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 541).
77. Id. at 22,125.
78. See, e.g., Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621,626 (11 th Cir. 2004).
79. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,126-27.
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The standard duties test for the administrative exemption dropped
two long-standing elements of that exemption: (1) the three-part
disjunctive test that had required an exempt employee to either assist an
exempt employee or work under general supervision in some capacity;
and (2) the twenty percent/forty percent cap on the amount of
nonexempt work that an employee could perform without losing exempt
status."s
Second, the DOL implemented a standard salary level, which
applied to executive, administrative, and professional employees. A
highly compensated employee exemption was created, which applied to
employees receiving a total annual compensation of at least $100,000.8'
Then, instead of the bifurcated $155/$250 per week salary level, the
DOL put in place a requirement that an exempt employee be paid on a
salary basis of $455 per week (or $23,660 annually). 82 The 2004
definition of an administrative employee reads as follows:
(a) The term "employee employed in a bona fide administrative
capacity" in section 13(a)(1) of the Act shall mean any employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455
per week (or $380 per week, if employed in American Samoa by
employers other than the Federal Government), exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual
work directly related to the management or general business operations
of the employer or the employer's customers; and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.
(b) The term "salary basis" is defined at § 541.602; "fee basis" is
defined at § 541.605; "board, lodging or other facilities" is defined at §
541.606; and "primary duty" is defined at § 541.700.83
When the DOL rolled out its 2004 regulations, it did not equivocate
in its determination that the regulations relating to the white-collar

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 22,127-28.
Id. at 22,123.
Id. at 22,126-27.
29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2005).
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exemptions had become "confusing, complex, and outdated., 84 In fact,
they had become so "confusing, complex, and outdated" that
"employment lawyers, and even Wage and Hour Division investigators
[had] difficulty determining whether employees qualiflied] for the
exemption., 85 The solution? Restore the meaning originally intended
for the white-collar
exemptions-the meaning that had "eroded over the
86
decades.,

The restoration would be especially vital to the administrative
exemption. The DOL was not shy in expressing the inherent challenges
to understanding the administrative exemption. It freely acknowledged
that the administrative exemption was "the most difficult to apply" and
"the most challenging ...to define." 87 It conceded that the exemption
had "generated significant confusion and litigation" and "become
increasingly difficult to apply with uniformity in the 21st century
workplace. 88
At bottom, "clearly defining and delimiting the
administrative exemption" was undoubtedly a "difficult task. '8 9 With a
plain vision of the complications surrounding the administrative
exemption, the DOL promulgated the present regulations.
Yet, the confusion and complexity persist over seven years later.
Indeed, the confusion and complexity linger to such a degree that Judge
Richard Posner characterizes the administrative exemption as "vague," 90
and the Ninth Circuit casts the exemption as "elusive." 9' In truth, the
DOL's 2004 regulations did little to restore meaning to the
administrative exemption because there was, in fact, little meaning to
restore. The meaning of the administrative exemption did not erode with
time; rather, Congress and the DOL crafted an exemption with few
definitional boundaries, producing an extremely vague and broad
exemption that captured (and would continue to capture) an inestimable
number of "white-collar" employees into its net.
Under the current framework, administrative employees must have
as their "primary duty" "the performance of office or non-manual work
directly related to the management or general business operations of the
84. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,122.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,560, 15,566-67 (proposed Mar. 31, 2003)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
88. Id.
89. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,139.
90. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2011).
91. Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002).
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employer or the employer's customers., 92 "The phrase 'directly related
to the management or general business operations' refers to the type of
work performed by the employee. 93 The duties test is phrased in the
disjunctive. An employee can fall under the exemption by either: (1)
being directly involved with management; or (2) being outside of the
management function but primarily involved with the employer's
"general business operations. 94
Both prongs of today's primary duties test reveal two distinct layers
of the challenge that resides in the task of defining the administrative
exemption. The first prong aligns the administrative and executive
exemptions in such a unified manner that it renders their distinction
nearly imperceptible. The second prong stretches the boundaries of the
administrative exemption so thin that the category of occupations that
can come within the exemption's broad sweep is unlimited and ever
growing in its variation.
III.

BLURRING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND

ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTIONS

In the seven-year span following the issuance of the DOL's revised
regulations in 2004, hundreds of federal court decisions were reported in
which a judge or jury reached a merits determination on the exempt
status of the plaintiff under the administrative exemption. In that time,
the job positions that the courts most commonly held to be exempt under
the administrative exemption were those involving managerial
authority-managers and supervisors 9 5-the flagship attribute of the
executive exemption. In the majority of those decisions, the managerial

92. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2) (2005). This primary duty test requires the performance of(l)
"office or nonmanual work;" (2) "directly relat[ed] to... management policies or general business
operations." Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 2005). The
requirement of "office or nonmanual work," however, is rarely disputed. See, e.g., id. ("Since both
parties agree that the plaintiffs do office or nonmanual work, our only inquiry is whether there is
any meaningful dispute about whether their primary duties directly relate to ComEd's management
policies or general business operations"). Since the 2004 regulations were issued, not one circuit
court decision treating the administrative exemption has addressed this element of the duties test.
The subject of this Article is on what types of duties bring employees within the administrative
exemption. As a result, the salary basis and salary level tests, which are not unique to the
administrative exemption, are also not the subject of this Article's discussion.
93. 29C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2011).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Hines v. State Room, Inc., 665 F.3d 235, 246-47 (1 st Cir. 2011); Cash v. Cycle
Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680, 686 (1st Cir. 2007); Bagwell v. Florida Broadband, LLC, 385 F.
Supp. 2d 1316, 1320, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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and supervisory employees were held, as a matter of law, to be exempt
under the administrative exemption. 96 A minority of the decisions held
that the plaintiffs were nonexempt as administrative employees. 97 The
table below reveals the figures for the top ten most common occupations
at issue in these administrative exemption decisions.
Occupation 98
Ma~nager

Sales Representative

# of Cases
i65
23

Exempt

Non-

Exempt

333

11

9

Supervisor

21

7

7

Director
Analyst
Officer

14
136
12

7

3

3

2

R~epreentative
(ohe tan saes)

Coordinator

12

~

'

4

9

12

1
_____

5

1

The overlap between these two exemptions is not recent history.
Indeed, the administrative and executive exemptions have shared an
inextricable tie, and the courts have oft found themselves tripping over
and confusing the distinction between the two exemptions.
A. Judicial Confusion
The judiciary's struggles revealed themselves as soon as the WHD
96. See, e.g., Cash, 508 F.3d at 685 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(e) (2004)) ("humanresources managers who formulate, interpret, or implement employment policies generally meet the
duties requirements for the exemption").
97. The figures for this analysis include only decisions where the court reached the merits of
the administrative exemption. Thus, the reported decisions do not include decisions approving a
settlement, decisions on a motion to dismiss, or decisions on a motion for certification or
decertification of a class.
98. When assessing the status of any given employee, the regulations provide that "[a] job
title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status of an employee ... [but rather] [t]he exempt
or nonexempt status of any particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the
employee's salary and duties meet the requirements of the regulations in this part." 29 C.F.R. §
541.2 (2011). Nonetheless, to assemble the type of quantifiable data used in this Article, the Author
used job titles as a measuring stick for trends in the administrative exemption since the new
regulations issued on August 23, 2004.
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created the separate definitions in 1940. The decision in Wilkinson v.
Noland Co.,99 for example, was issued less than one year after Harold
Stein's 1940 Report and Recommendation.1 °0 In that case, a company's
purchasing agent sought damages under the FLSA. 01' The federal
district court viewed "executive" as "a reasonably well understood
term," pinpointing the executive's duties as those relating "to active
participation in control, supervision and management of a business. '0 2
Despite the newfangled separation of the executive and administrative
exemptions, the court's concept of an administrative employee differed
little from that of an executive employee, defining an administrative
employee as "one who directs, manages, executes or dispenses."10 3 The
district court proceeded to analyze the same10 set
of factors to rule that the
4
employee qualified under both exemptions.
Federal courts throughout the 1940s continued to grapple with
distinguishing the two exemptions. In Burke v. Lecrone-Benedict
Ways, 10 5 the district court opined that "while an administrator is not
necessarily an executive, the term 'executive' as it works out in practice
is broad enough to include one who also has administrative duties,
particularly when the border line is so close as to call for decision by the
courts.' 0 6 In Hoff v. North American Aviation, Inc.,' °7 the district court
concluded that the executive and administrative exemptions "are
certainly in the same field," as "the very words, themselves, import
authority, discretion and certain powers which are ordinarily incident to
the not-at-all disliked American word, 'boss." ' 0 8 In Marian v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp.,109 the district court stated that the administrative
exemption "covers largely the same as that covered by" the executive
exemption.110 And numerous other federal courts held plaintiffs to be
exempt as executive or administrative employees based on the same set
of facts, making no distinction between the facts that favored the
executive exemption and those that favored the administrative

99.

40 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Va. 1941).

100.

Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1010-11.
Id.at Ioil.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1012.
63 F. Supp. 883,885 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
Id.
67 F. Supp. 375, 377 (N.D. Tex. 1946).

108.

Id.

109.
110.

65 F. Supp. 18, 19 (N.D. Tex. 1946).
Id.
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exemption. 111
Despite the DOL's honorable intentions in 2004 of
"enhanc[ing] ... the boundaries and demarcations of the exemptions, '12
the dividing line between the executive and administrative exemptions
continues to blur today. In Jackson v. City of San Antonio, 13 for
example, a putative class of police officers filed a lawsuit under the
FLSA against the City of San Antonio.' 14 The City moved for summary
judgment as to five officers, arguing they were exempt under the
executive and administrative exemptions. The district court carefully
walked through each of the factors of the executive exemption,
concluding that the City had failed to meet its burden on summary
judgment on the executive exemption. 15
But no analysis occurred as to the administrative exemption.
According to the district court, it had already performed the essential
analysis for the administrative exemption when it earlier analyzed the
executive exemption:
The analysis of the administrative and executive exemption are nearly
identical. For the reasons stated in the discussion of the executive
exemption, the Court is of the opinion that it... cannot find at this
stage that the administrative exemption applies to these Officers, either
independently or in combination with the executive exemption. 116
The district court in Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee Co.117 took
exactly the same approach. 18 After noting that the term "primary duty"
under the administrative exemption "carries the same definition that it
does for the executive exemption," the district court issued the following
ruling in holding that the employer had prevailed in defeating the
employee's summary judgment motion on the administrative exemption:
"For the same reasons already cited for the executive exemption, the
Court concludes that Defendant has proffered evidence creating a

111. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Atkinson, 43 F. Supp. 96, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1942); Sauls v. Martin, 45
F. Supp. 801, 803 (W.D. S.C. 1942); Christiansen v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 66 F. Supp. 835, 836 (N.D.
Ohio 1946).
112. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,125 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
113. No. SA-03-CA-0049-RF, 2006 WL 2548545 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2006).
114. Id. at*1.
115. Id. at *8-11.
116.
117.

Id. at *12.
No. 04-80521-CIV, 2008 WL 763213 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2008).

118.

Id. at *9.
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question of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' primary duties were
managerial.""1 9
In Bosch v. Title Max, Inc.,' 20 the district court reached its decision
with a similar analysis as that used in Burke and Pendlebury, but in the
reverse direction. 12 The district court started its analysis with the
administrative exemption. But because it did not believe there was "one
clear test" for the duties test, it engaged in an analysis "specifically
applicable to the 'executive exemption,"' deciding that it "is also useful
in considering whether a plaintiff's duties fall into the administrative
exemption. ,,122
After concluding that summary judgment was
appropriate in favor of the employer on the administrative exemption,
the court concluded that "[g]iven the overlapping analysis of the
administrative and executive exemptions, it also seems likely that...
1 23
she was also exempt from the FLSA under the executive exemption."
One of the most poignant illustrations of the modem struggle to
distinguish these two exemptions comes from the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Vela v. City of Houston.1 24 In that case, a putative class of
fire department employees sought overtime pay under FLSA and state
law against the City of Houston. 125 In denying the City's motion for
summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the executive and
of "the
under
the framework
administrative
exemptions
Executive/Administrative exemption," holding that "[t]he evidence in
this case does not satisfy the City's burden of proving the
Executive/Administrative exemption."1 26 The Fifth Circuit's analysis
revealed little progress since the WHD's 1938 joint definition of the two
exemptions.

119. Id.
120. No. CIV.A.03-AR-0463-S, 2005 WL 357411 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7,2005).
121. Id.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id. at *9 ("[B]ecause the much of analysis used to conclude that Parker met the
administrative exemption is lifted from the executive exemption, ... summary judgment is also
appropriate under the 'executive exemption').
124. Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 676-77 (5th Cir. 200t).
125. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 677. Various other court decisions since the 2004 regulations were issued illustrate
the lingering confusion. See, e.g., Wright v. Monroe Cnty., No. 05-CV-6268T, 2007 WL 1434793,
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007) (holding police captain was an "executive or administrative
employee" because he was "the highest ranking official in the Department, and ... supervise[d]
more than 20 lower-ranking officers").
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B. Tools of Statutory Construction
The judiciary's longstanding inability to distinguish between the
executive and administrative exemptions is bewildering. But it is
unsurprising. In interpreting statutory terms, such as "executive" and
"administrative," courts typically look at the ordinary meaning of the
statutory text. 127 Tools such as dictionaries and thesauruses are often
12 8
useful in shedding light on the ordinary meaning of certain terms.
Where no clear meaning manifests itself, the legislative history can
prove useful. 129 In this case, unfortunately, the ordinary meaning of
each of the words shared a linguistic link that inevitably blurred the
distinction, if there was ever any, between the two exemptions. And
Congress failed to provide any other guidance, in the legislative history
or elsewhere, that would direct the courts to any different meaning.
1. Dictionaries
Dictionaries current at the time of the FLSA's enactment reveal that
members of the 75th-Congress would have viewed the terms "executive"
and "administrative" as virtually synonymous.
Webster's New
International Dictionary of the English Language defined
"administrative" to mean "of or pertaining to administration, esp.
management; executive."'' 30 It defined "executive," in turn, as "any
person charged with administrative or executive work."' 3' Similarly, the
Oxford English Dictionary defined "administrative" as "[p]ertaining
to,
132
or dealing with, the conduct or management of affairs; executive.'
Variations of the term "administrative" pointed in the same
direction. Webster's-defined the term "administrator" as "one who
administers; a manager, esp. one who directs, manages, executes.' 33
The Oxford English Dictionary defined "administrator" as "[o]ne who
127. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
128. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 1264 (2011); CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 1108 (2011); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 556 U.S. 599, 611 (2009).
129. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 53, 62 (2004); see also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) ("[O]ur obligation is to take statutes as we find
them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose").
130. LINDER, supra note 25, at 429 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 892 (1942 [1934])).
131.
Id.
132. Id.(quoting OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1:118 (1961 [1933])).
133
Id.at 432 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE 34 (1942 [1934])).
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134

administers; one who manages."
The entanglement of the terms "executive" and "administrative"
The following list of definitions from modem
persists today.
dictionaries illustrates the thin line between these two key terms.

Oxford Dictionaryof English
"administer": "manage and be responsible for the running of (a
' 135
business, organization, etc.)."

The Concise Oxford Dictionaryof CurrentEnglish
"administer": "attend to the running of (business affairs etc.);
136
manage."
"administrative": "concerning or relating to the management of
13 7
affairs."

The New Oxford American Dictionary
"administer": "manage and be responsible for the running of (a
138
business, organization, etc.)."'

The American HeritageDictionaryof English Language
139
"administer": "to have charge of; manage."'

"administrator": "one who administers, especially one who works as a
140
manger in a business, government agency, or school."

The Random House College Dictionary
"administer": "to manage (affairs, a government, etc.); have executive
14 1
charge of."

The Cassell Concise Dictionary

134.

Id. (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1:118 (1961 [1933])).

135.
136.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 21 (2d ed. 1998).
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 17 (9th ed. 1995).

137.

Id. at 18.

138.
139.

THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 20 (2001).
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 22 (4th ed. 2000).

140.

Id.

141.

THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 18 (rev. ed. 1984).
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"administer": "to manage or conduct as chief agent." 142
Chambers Concise Dictionary
"administer":

"to manage, govern
43
organization, etc.)."

or direct (one's affairs

an

Collins English Dictionary
"administration": "management of the affairs of an organization such
144
as a business or institution."
Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language
145
"administrative": "of or connected with administration; executive."

"administration": "the act of administering; management; specif., the
' 146
management of governmental or institutional affairs."
The New York Times Everyday Dictionary
"administer": "manage." 147
2. Thesauruses
Modem thesauruses similarly reflect the synonymous nature of the
terms "administrative" and "executive."
The Oxford American
Thesaurus of Current English provides the following synonyms for
"administrative":
"managerial,
management,
directorial,
[and]
executive."' 148 It provides the following for "administer": "manage,
direct, control, conduct, run, govern, operate, superintend, supervise,
oversee, preside over.' ' 149 The Longman Synonym Dictionary gives the
following synonyms for "administrative": "managerial, directorial,...
executive, executory, authoritative, official, [and] directive." 150 Roget's
21st Century Thesaurus defines the term "administration" as

142.
143.
144.
145.

THE CASSELL CONCISE DICTIONARY 19 (1997).
CHAMBERS CONCISE DICTIONARY 14 (2004).
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 19 (3d ed. 1991).
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 18 (2d ed. 1982).

146.

Id.

147.
148.
149.
150.

THE NEW YORK TIMES EVERYDAY DICTIONARY 8 (1982).
THE OXFORD AMERICAN THESAURUS OF CURRENT ENGLISH 14 (2002).
Id
LONGMAN SYNONYM DICTIONARY 25 (1986).
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"management of an organization or effort" and provides the following
synonyms for "administrative": "executive," "in charge," "central,"
"commanding," "authoritative," "policy-making," and "managerial.''
3. Etymology
The etymology of the term "administer" is also enlightening as to
the close relationship between these two terms. The term derives from
the Middle English administren, which derives from the Old French
administrer, which derives from the Latin administrre.152 The Latin
term administrdreis a compound of ad and ministrdre.'53 The prefix of
"ad' means

,to.',

154

The root "ministrdre" means "to serve" or "to wait

56
upon,"' from which the modem English term "minister" derives.
The base of the Latin "ministrdre" comes from the Latin word for
55

"minus"

(meaning "less")1 57 or "minor, lesser."'

"[e]tymologically,
' , 159
'servant.

58

Accordingly,

a minister is a person of 'lower'

status, a

This "servant" meaning eventually developed a specialized usage in
important contexts. Specifically, by the Middle Ages, a "minister" was
used to refer to a "church functionary," which is now associated with the
present-day "clergyman."' 60 And by the seventeenth century, the term
"minister" took on a specialized political meaning to refer to a
government official or officer, which still exists in governments today
(e.g., Prime Minister of England).' 61 The ecclesiastical "minister" was
deemed to be the "servant of his congregation" and the governmental

151.
ROGET'S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 17 (3d ed. 2005).
152. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 22 (4th ed. 2000)
(under definition of "administer").
153. T.F. HOAD, THE CONCISE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 6 (1986).
154. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1118 (2d ed. 1998) (under definition for "ministration").
155.
D.P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'SNEW LATIN DICTIONARY 373 (1959).
156. WALTER W. SKEAT, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 8,
369 (2d ed. 1883).
157.
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORD HISTORIES 328 (2002).
158.
ERIC PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ENGLISH 406 (1966).

159.
160.

JOHN AYTO, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 349 (1990).
Id.; PARTRIDGE, supra note 158, at 406 (defining the Latin "minister" as "one who

serves or assists another, hence at a religious cult, hence of a public office, finally one at the head of
a political department"); ERNEST WEEKLEY, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ENGLISH 933 (1967) (noting that the Latin "minister" was "found in pre-Reformation times of an
ecclesiastic charged with some spec. function. Sense of high officer of Crown from 17 cent.").
161.
AYTO, supra note 158, at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"minister" was understood to be "one serving the king or queen.' ' 162
Although the "minister" was a servant to a greater or larger
individual or entity, the minister possessed and exercised a significant, if
not absolute, degree of authority over the members of the congregation
or citizens of the state. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Latin term
"minister," or "ministrdre," from which our modem-day term
"administer" derives, is associated with managing. Accordingly, The
American HeritageDictionarypairs the Latin term "ministrdre" with "to
manage."' 163 Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary of English 64treats the Latin
term for "administrate" as synonymous with "managed."''
4. Legislative History
Based upon the virtually identical meaning shared by the terms
"administrative" and "executive," the WHD and the courts received little
aid from the ordinary meaning of these terms in construing Congress's
intent for these two exemptions. 165 In such circumstances, the legislative
history could have proven an effective tool for discerning the
congressional intent behind statutory language.
Further, given the impact of the white-collar exemptions, one
would expect to find substantive commentary related to these
exemptions in the FLSA's legislative history. According to the first
post-FLSA census, conducted in 1940, America's workforce included
over 16 million white-collar workers-about thirty percent of the
working population. 166 The percentage of affected workers remained
steady over time. In 1998, the DOL estimated that for the year 1996,
over 31 million-approximately twenty-six percent of all wage and
under the executive, administrative,
salary workers-were "exempt
167
professional exemption."'
The legislative history, unfortunately, is hollow. The dearth of
discussion on the white-collar exemptions has not gone unnoticed. In its
1999 report, the GAO observed: "The legislative history for the FLSA
contains no explanation for the [white-collar] exemption.' ' 168 Similarly,

162.

WILLIAM & MARY MORRIS, DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 178 (1971).

163. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 22 (4th ed. 2000)
(under definition of "administer").
164. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 21 (2d ed. 1998) (under definition for "ministration").
165. See supra pp. 506-10.
166. LINDER,supra note 25, at 8.
167. Id. at 13.
168.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 58, at 5 n.4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/6

26

Bertagna: The "Miscellaneous Employee": Exploring the Boundaries of the Fai

20121

THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE"

in connection with its proposed 2004 regulations, the DOL concluded
that references to the white-collar exemptions in the legislative history
are "scant."' 169 Law professor Marc Linder, who has written extensively
on wage-and-hour legislation in the United States, concluded:
Virtually nothing said at the extensive 1937 congressional hearings on
the FLSA (transcribed on more than 1,200 printed pages) or during the
1937-38 protracted congressional debates (transcribed over almost 600
tightly printed, double-columned pages), or written in the Senate or
House committee reports of those years sheds any light whatsoever on
the purpose or scope of170
the exclusion of executive, administrative, or
professional employees.
One of the earliest academic treatments of the FLSA's legislative
history concluded that "there were really only three main points of
7
contention" at the heart of the year-long struggle to enact the FLSA.' 1
One was the "administrative machinery" that would be responsible for
the FLSA's enforcement, which ultimately resulted in the FLSA being
172
administered by a single administrator of a newly created WHD.
Another centered "around the issue of flexib[ility] against rigid
standards., 173 The other
turned on the enforcement mechanism for the
1 74
child labor provisions.
Ten different bills swept through Congress amidst the debates on
these hot-button issues, among others. 175 The original bill excluded
those employed in an executive, administrative, and professional
capacity. Beyond moving the placement for these exclusions from one
section to another, virtually no one-Republican, Democrat, union
representative, employer, or employee-voiced any concern or provided
any input on the propriety, purpose, or scope of these white-collar
169. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,123 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541); see also Michael Cicala, Equalizing Workers in Ties and Coveralls:
Removal of the White-collar Exemption to the FairLabor StandardsAct, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
139, 147 n.49 (2002) ("The White Collar Exemption does not have a clear legislative history to
show what the terms 'administrative,' 'professional,' or 'executive' mean"); Ashley M. Rothe,
Blackberrys and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Does a Wireless Ball and Chain Entitle WhiteCollar Workers to Overtime Compensation?, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 709, 727-28 (2010) (noting that
"the legislative history includes no explanation for the white-collar exemptions").
170. LNDER, supra note 25, at 385-86 (footnotes omitted).
171. See Forsythe, supranote 9, at 474.
172. Seeid at475-77.
173. See id. at 478-79.
174. See id at487-89.
175. See id. at474.
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exemptions. The silence is deafening.
5. Legal/Common Usage
With no distinct ordinary meaning for the administrative exemption
and no legislative commentary on the meaning of this elusive
exemption, the DOL and the courts may have looked to contemporary
sources to understand the meaning of an administrative employee.
Again, these resources offered little help.
Relevant federal court decisions are few in number. Between 1900
and the FLSA's enactment, the term "administrative employee" arises in
only a few decisions. 17 6 And none of them are enlightening as to the
meaning or scope of that term.177
The term "administrative staff' appears in a few cases. 118 They are
similarly unhelpful. In fact, one of them demonstrates the entwinement
of the terms "executive" and "administrative." The decision of Jones v.
Commissioner17 9 involved an appeal from a determination by the Board
of Tax Appeals that a distribution of stock to a corporation's "officers
and administrative staff' constituted a gift or compensation. 80 In
reversing the Board's decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
characterized the "administrative staff' as including "every one from
president to stenographers." 181 It confirmed, therefore, the broad scope
of an administrative employee or staff.
There are also decisions from the time period mentioning
employees working in an administrative "capacity" or "position." But as
with the prior class of decisions, of those that do have any substance,
they tend to reflect the shared meaning between the terms "executive"
and "administrative." In American Cigar Co. v. Commissioner,182 for
example, the Board of Tax Appeals recited the following contractual
provision: "You are to enter into the employ of the Cuban Land & Leaf
Tobacco Company and devote such time and attention in a managerial or
other administrative capacity to its affairs." 183 The contract, therefore,
176. See, e.g., Certain-teed Prods. Corp. v. Wallinger, 89 F.2d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 1937).
177. See, e.g., id.; T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 1169,1178 (B.T.A. 1930).
178. Morrell v. Comm'r, Nos. 74916-74918, 75822, 75875-75883, 75921, 76228-76230,
77226, 1936 WL 7054, at *4 (B.T.A. 1936); Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1929);
Dold Packing Co. v. Doermann, 293 F. 315, 317 (8th Cir. 1923).
179. 31 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1929).
180. Id.at755-56
181. Id.at755.
182. 21 B.T.A. 464 (B.T.A. 1930).
183. Id.at 478-79 (emphasis added).
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reflects an understanding that one functioning in a managerial position
was also serving in an administrative position.
With its specialization in employment matters, the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") might produce a deeper pool of decisions
shedding light on the concept of an administrative employee. Of course,
the NLRB had only been around a few years at the time of the FLSA's
Yet the few decisions mentioning an administrative
enactment.
employee before or around 1938 demonstrate the lack of an accepted
meaning of this term. In International Harvester Co.,184 the Board
mentioned that a facility boasted 4,150 employees at a facility, 514 of
which "were clerical, supervisory and administrative employees."'' 85 In
La Crosse Garment Industries,'86 the NLRB certified a bargaining unit
that consisted of the respondent company's "production employees ...
exclusive of maintenance, office and clerical workers and all employees
in administrative and supervisory positions, including foreladies and
instructors. ' 87 In both decisions, the NLRB communicated a view of
the administrative and clerical employees as occupying distinct fields.
A later decision did not corroborate this position. In Aluminum Co.
of America, 8 8 the Board certified the following bargaining unit for
"administrative staff' of Aluminum Company of America, defined to
include:
[Office and clerical workers, metermen, lead men, routine chemists,

chemists' assistants, and dust, gas, and laboratory technicians...
excluding executives and department heads, foremen, shift foremen,
and assistant foremen, the yardmaster and assistant yardmaster,
research chemists, secretaries to all executives and department heads,
employees in the cost department, and the personal chauffeur to the
president. 189
treated administrative employees as
In this decision, the Board
1 90
workers.'
clerical
encompassing

184.

2 N.L.R.B. 310 (1936).

185.
186.
187.

Id. at 317.
5N.L.R.B. 127 (1938).
Id. at 130-31.

188.

9 N.L.R.B. 141 (1938).

189. Id. at 145-46 (emphasis added).
190. Id. Law journals are not more illuminating. A review of law reviews during this time
yields similar results. One HarvardLawReview article, for example, commented that two business
organizations' "executive heads had evinced an administrative capacity that may reasonably be
classed as of a superior order." Myron W. Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy - I1, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 926, 942 (1922). There are various other law journal articles, as well as court decisions,
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Public, nonlegal sources also fail to reveal a common understanding
of an administrative employee. Few articles from the New York Times,
Los Angeles Times, and Wall Street Journal between 1900 and 1938
even mention an administrative employee. 91 The predominant use of
the term "administrative employee" was in the context of government
employees. 192 One New York Times article, for example, focused on the
increased benefits to administrative employees or staff throughout the
Albany school system. 193 In particular, the term "administrative
employees" often arose in the context of those working within the
Works Progress Administration. 194 These articles reflect what was
evidently the most common understanding of an administrative
employee, i.e., one who works for a government agency. 195 Thus, in this
particular setting, references to administrative employees are of little
assistance in interpreting the meaning Congress intended for the FLSA's
administrative exemption.
The most promising resource that the DOL and agencies had for
understanding the FLSA's administrative exemption was probably the
competition codes enacted under the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which served as important predecessors for the FLSA. 96 Numerous
between 1900 and 1938 using the term of an administrative employee or capacity, but in the context
of describing action by a government agency. See, e.g., Notes, The Restraint of Proceedings in
State Courts by the Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L. REV. 461, 464 (1923); D. Meade Felid, Book
Review, Cases and Other Materialson Administrative Tribunals, 16 TEX.L. REV. 140, 143 (1938);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Bauman, 69 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir. 1934).
191. See, e.g., Heavy Cut Orderedin AidForce,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1934, at A3; Virginia A.
Small, Chief Clerk in a Boardof Education Bureau is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1929, at 25.
192. See Inquiry Shows Status of Force Under S.E.R.A., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1934, at Al
(discussing financial status of administrative employees/staff at local government agency); "White
Collar" Unemployed Increase in Soviet Union, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1927, at xx5 (citing average
monthly wage of "[g]ovemment administrative employees" in Soviet Union); Small, supra note 187
(referring to the "Association of Administrative Employees" of Board of Education); Heavy Cut
Orderedin Aid Force, supra note 187, at A3; Grant Averts Relief Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1935,
at 2; L.A.C.R.A. Will Cut Pay of 2400 on Staff Today, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1936, at Al (discussing
salary reduction to administrative employees in Los Angeles County Relief Administration).
193. School Rises Voted by EducationBoard,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1927, at 3.
194. Dole Expose Links W.P.A., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1935, at 1; Cruel and Unusual, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1935, at A4; W.P.A. Heads' Pay Slashed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1935, at 3; The
Work-Relief Failure,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at A4; Federal Relief Costs Expected to be Cut
Sharply This Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1937, at 41; Tumer Catledge, Roosevelt Ousts Foe of Gov.
Benson in Minnesota WPA, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,1938, at 1.
195. The D.C. Circuit recently acknowledged this specialized meaning of "administrative,"
stating that the term "administrative" typically "refers to action by an agency." Singleton v.
Babbitt, 588 F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 28 (1976) (defining "administrative law"

as "law dealing with... authorized agencies in the executive branch of government").
196. The National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), was "the first comprehensive, national
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codes and proposed codes contained exemptions for administrative
employees.1 97 These codes, however, fell victim to the same lack of
definition and direction. The Liquor Code, for example, prohibited
employers from working their employees in excess of forty-two hours in
one week, or eight hours in one workday, with the exception of several
categories of employees, including certain "[e]xecutive, supervisory,
technical, and administrative employees.., and outside salesmen."' 198
Although the Liquor Code defined other categories of excluded
employees, such as "watchmen," it declined to define administrative
employees. 199
C. An Alternative to the Executive Exemption
Harold Stein recognized the predicament underlying the coexistence of the executive and administrative exemptions. In his 1940
report, he recognized that these two terms "are used synonymously in
common speech and in court decisions., 20 0 Further, Stein noted, "the
use of the two terms is so vague and so overlapping that there is no
them.",20 1
generally recognized and precise line of demarcation between
Thus, by creating a distinct exemption for the "administrative"

effort to regulate minimum wages and maximum hours for men and women in the United States."
Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairnessand the FairLabor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 19, 105 (2000). The centerpiece of the NIRA was the formulation of industry codes, a
process administered by the National Recovery Administration. See CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN
DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 303 (2003). The NIRA authorized the President,
upon application by a trade or industrial association, to promulgate "codes of fair competition" for
the trade or industry. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, § 3(a), 48 Stat. 195, 196
(1933). The NIRA required every code of fair competition to impose a condition upon all
employers to "comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other
conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President." § 7(a), 48 Stat. at 199. The
cotton textile industry provided the first of these codes. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL
YEARS, 1933-1937, at 247 (1986). The Cotton Textile Code, signed by President Roosevelt on July
9, 1933, implemented a minimum hourly wage of $13 in the North and $12 in the South, established
a 40-hour workweek, and outlawed child labor under the age of 16. Id. at 248. The Cotton Textile
Code served as a model for the codes that followed. Id. at 247. The NIRA ultimately produced
nearly 700 industry codes. Id. at 259. The code-making process ended when the NIRA was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
197. See, e.g., Text of Substitute Codefor Liquor Manufacturers,WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1933,
at 10, art. III (1)(a); Text of Grain Exchange FairCompetition Code, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1934, at
8, art. III (d).
198. Text of Substitute Codefor Liquor Manufacturers,supra note 193, at10, art. llI(1)(a).
199. Id. at art. N (h).
200. Stein Report, supra note 30, at 4.
201. Id.
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employee, Congress "introduced a concept with which there had been
little, if any, experience and the full implications of which were as yet
unknown ' 20 2 It is therefore unsurprising that the WHD tried to evade
distinguishing the synonymous terms by creating a joint
executive/administrative
exemption, thereby writing the term
"administrative" out of the FLSA.20 3
Nonetheless, Stein still attempted to create a separate definition for
the administrative exemption. By classifying administrative employees,
in part, as those whose primary duty is "directly related to management,"
the interchangeability of the administrative and executive exemptionswhich stems from their strong lexiconic ties-was permanently
incorporated into the administrative exemption's very definition.20 4 As a
result, those who manage-and therefore perform the primary duty of
the prototypical executive employee 205 -can concurrently fall under the
administrative exemption. The First and Eleventh Circuits provide
illustrative decisions.
In Rock v. Ray Anthony International,LLC,20 6 a dispatcher for a

crane rental company sued his former employer under the FLSA.° 7
After identifying the responsibilities performed by the dispatcher, the
court of appeals agreed with the district court that "[g]iven the amount of
time [the plaintiff] spent on managerialduties, it is determined that [the
plaintiffs] primary duty was the management of Sunbelt's crane rental
division., 20 8 Neither the district court nor the court of appeals held that
the dispatcher was an exempt executive employee. In fact, the executive
exemption was not even at issue. Rather, they both held that the
dispatcher-in light of her primary duty of management-qualifiedas
exempt under the administrative exemption.20 9
In Cash v. Cycle Craft Co.,210 the First Circuit held that the New
Purchase/Customer Relations Manager at a motorcycle store satisfied the
administrative exemption because he met "the 'management' and
'
'discretion' requirements of the administrative exemption."21t
Notably,

202.
203.
204.
205.

Weiss Report, supranote 44, at 54.
See id.
Id.at52.
See infra text accompanying note 216.

206.

380 F. App'x 875 (11th Cir. 2010).

207.

Id.at876.

208.
209.

Id.at 878 (emphases added) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
Id. at 876 ("In this appeal, we consider whether a salaried dispatcher for a crane rental

company qualifies under the administrative exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act").
210. 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007).
211. Id.at 686.
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the court of appeals did not touch upon whether the employee's duties
were directly related to the employer's general business operations. The
satisfaction of the "management" prong of the administrative exemption
was sufficient for the court of appeals to decide that the employee fell
within the administrative exemption.
Accordingly, those individuals who manage-the prototypical
executive employee'12-fall within the administrative exemption under
this management prong. As a result, the administrative exemption
immediately sweeps in a whole class of employees already potentially
exempt under the executive exemption. But it goes even beyond the
executive exemption, reaching a vaster class of managerial employees.
If an employee manages, for example, but does not satisfy the executive
exemption's requirements of managing two or more full-time employees
or possessing the authority to hire or fire, the employee can still qualify
as an administrative employee with his or her management-related
duties.213 The administrative exemption, therefore, functions as an
effective alternative to the executive exemption.
IV. EXEMPTION

FOR THE "MISCELLANEOUS"

A. The PrototypicalAdministrative Employee?
Although employees exempt under the administrative exemption
may perform management duties, the administrative exemption "is not to
be limited solely to so-called 'management' personnel. 21 4 It "is not
limited to persons who participate in the formulation of management
policies or in the operation of the business as a whole., 2t5 It
encompasses "a wide variety of persons" who perform work "directly
related to... general business operations"-who do not manage and
who have no involvement with creating the employer's policies, but who
212. See infra text accompanying note 216.
213. See, e.g., Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 203 F.3d 326, 331-33 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that employee was exempt under the administrative, but not executive, exemption).
214. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 10(1st Cir. 1997).
215. Id. With the 2004 regulations, the DOL removed the term "policies" from the preexisting
requirement that the employee's primary duty involve "[t]he performance of office or nonmanual
work directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his
employer's customers." Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (2003) (emphasis added) (stating the word
"policies"), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2005) (failing to state the word "policies"). See also
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales
and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,137-38 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
541). The deletion of the term "policies" arguably broadened the scope of the administrative
exemption.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

33

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

carry out "major assignments in conducting the operations of the
business, or whose work affects business operations to a substantial
degree, even though their assignments are tasks related to the operation
of a particular segment of the business. 216 The mere inclusion of the
qualifier, "general," alludes to the inclusive scope of functions that an
employee can perform to qualify under this component of the
administrative exemption.
For this very reason, the administrative exemption, in contrast to its
fellow white-collar exemptions, carries with it no image of a
prototypical administrative employee. On the other hand, both the
executive and professional exemptions immediately conjure an image of
the representative exempt employee, or at minimum, a defining attribute
of the exempt employee.
As Harold Stein observed in 1940, the executive employee is the
"boss." 217 The manager of a retail store presents an effective illustration.
The manager is the store's highest-level employee who is responsible for
nearly every aspect of the store's operations. The manager opens and
closes the store. The store manager trains, supervises, disciplines,
evaluates, and fires employees. The manager orders and oversees the
store's inventory. The store manager handles relations and disputes with
customers. The manager oversees the store's budget and handles the
incoming and outgoing money. In brief, the manager ensures that the
store operates successfully and profitably. The defining attribute of the
executive employee, therefore, is management.2 18
An analogous example of the professional employee is the medical
doctor. A doctor completes over a decade of academic studies and
intensive training to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to
practice medicine. Indeed, the doctor cannot even enter the profession
and lawfully practice his or her trade without such extensive
prerequisites and certifications. The nature of the doctor's work requires
the doctor to make regular judgments that can permanently alter a
patient's health, happiness, and well-being. And the doctor could not
make or execute those decisions without the advanced knowledge and
skills laboriously acquired over thousands of hours of study and
instruction. 219 The core attribute of the professional employee,
216.

Reich, 126 F.3d at 10.

217.
Stein Report, supra note 30, at 4.
218.
See id. at 24 ("[1]t is both convenient and appropriate to limits [sic] the term 'executive'
to persons whose duties include some form of managerial authority-to persons who actually direct
the work of other persons").

219.

The professional exemption is divided into two types of professionals: learned
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therefore, is learning or knowledge.22 °
In contrast, the administrative exemption fails to evoke an image of
any representative employee, or even a universal characteristic that
defines the administrative employee.
The perplexity of the
administrative exemption is rooted in the tremendous scope afforded by
the broad and ambiguous language, "general business operations." As
one court recently observed:
In an abstract sense, this regulatory definition applies to all work
performed in a business setting because all work is directly related to
the "general business operations" of an employer. This, of course,
cannot constitute the true meaning.., because it would exempt all
employees from earning overtime pay,22in which case the exemption
would amount to a self-defining nullity. 1
B. Stein's Solution
Harold Stein's Report and Recommendation is illuminating as to
the extraordinary breadth originally envisioned for the administrative
exemption, as understood by the agency delegated the authority to
interpret the exemption only two years after the FLSA's enactment.2 22
In particular, Stein's efforts to distinguish the executive and
administrative exemptions are telling. He crisply concluded that the
executive exemption is reserved for those with "managerial
authority.' 223
With his effective shortcut to defining executive
employees, one would hope Stein would construct an equally cogent
formula for defining administrative employees. His solution is to
reserve the administrative exemption "for persons performing a variety
of miscellaneous but important functions in business. 224 He bolstered
the vague and expansive characterization of administrative employees by
observing that the number of administrative employees "is large in
modem industrial practice. 225
professionals and artistic professionals. Id. at 33. This illustration uses the learned professional as
its model exempt professional employee.
220. See id.at 35.
221.
Hodge v. Aon Ins. Servs., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 374 (Ct. App. 2011).
222.
Stein Report, supra note 30, at 1-2. A government agency's interpretation of statutory
language should be given more weight "if made near the time the statute was enacted when

congressional debates and interest group positions were fresh in the administrators' minds."
Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
223. See Stein Report, supranote 30, at 24.

224.
225.

Id.
Id.
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Stein's discussion of the "main aspects of the problem" with the
administrative exemption further reveals the predicament that existed
with this exemption from the outset. 26 He identified two problems. He
first concluded that "the definition must be sufficiently broad and
general to include employees performing a great variety of tasks. 227
This conclusion corroborates Stein's earlier determination that the
administrative exemption embraces an undefined group of
"miscellaneous" employees within a business. He then opined that "the
definition must contain such delimiting requirements ... as will prevent
abuse. 228 In other words, Stein himself recognized that the group of
employees swallowed up into the administrative exemption was so
broad, so undefined, that it was naturally prone to manipulation.
Harold Stein's solution to placing limits on the administrative
exemption, and thereby preventing abuse, only further demonstrates the
tremendous scope of this exemption today. According to Stein, any type
of duties test was bound to be ineffective.22 9 He opined that "there is no
description of duties or titles which in and of itself can ... differentiate
between those persons who may reasonably be exempt under the act and
those who deserve and require its benefits., 23 0 His solution was the
salary level. According to him, the salary test is the best way to check
the validity of the exemption, as it shows that "the person whose
exemption is desired is actually of such importance to the firm that he is
properly describable as an employee employed in a bona fide
administrative capacity., 2 31 To that end, he set the salary level at $200
per month, 232
in contrast to the executive employee's $120 per month
salary level.
The problem with Stein's solution to correcting the administrative
exemption is that it no longer has that feature under the DOL's 2004
regulations. First, there no longer exists a distinction among the whitecollar employees based upon salary level. Today, the standard $455 per
month applies to executive, administrative, and professional
employees.2 33 Second, in 2004, the DOL adopted a salary level that was
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.

Id.

232. See id.
233. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #17: EXEMPTION FOR EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE,
PROFESSIONAL, COMPUTER & OUTSIDE SALES EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT

(FLSA)

(2008),
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below the inflation-adjusted amount of the prior salary levels. 234 When
adjusted for inflation, the $155 for the long test and the $250 for the
short test would have been $530 and $855 per week (approximately
$27,560 and $44,460 per year), respectively.23 5 In other words, Stein's
"vital" guide for distinguishing exempt from nonexempt administrative
employees has evaporated under the 2004 regulations. Now, under the
present framework, the exempt analysis largely turns on the duties test.
But Stein himself believed that the scope of an administrative
employee's job duties was so "extremely diverse ' 236 that any
standardization of the duties performed by an exempt employee was
unattainable.
C. A Diverse Population
Case law following the 2004 regulations confirms Stein's 1940
classification of administrative employees as "miscellaneous.'" Exempt
administrative employees range from police captains to racing officials,
sales representatives, tax consultants, and "legislative liaisons. 2 37
Exempt administrative employees work in pharmaceutical companies,
elementary schools, power companies, insurance companies, mortgage
brokers, retailers, night clubs, accounting firms, and casinos. At bottom,
the administrative employee cannot be squeezed into any one box. The
table below lists positions that courts and juries, since the 2004
regulations were issued, have found to be exempt under the
administrative exemption. 8
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/fairpay/fsl 7a overview.pdf.
234. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,165 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 541); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Changes, S.C. HUM. RESOURCES Div.,
www.ohr.sc.gov/OHR/employer/FLSA-Handout.doc (last visited May 16,2012).
235. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,165.
236. See Stein Report, supra note 30, at 25.
237. See, e.g., Thomas G. Paese, Management Directive, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2
(Feb.
10,
1997),
http://www.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS 0 2 5337_0_0 43/http%3B/pubcontent.s
tate.pa.us/publishedcontent/publish/global/files/management directives/employee development/52
5_15.pdf (noting that legislative liaisons are exempt administrative employees).
238. In reviewing the above-mentioned job titles that have been held to be exempt under the
administrative exemption, care must be given to the well-accepted understanding that "analysis of
the FLSA exemption is a fact-intensive inquiry." Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571
F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Adams v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 795, 797 n.1(1990)
("Exemption determinations are fact-intensive inquiries which frequently turn on the particular
duties of specific employees"). Thus, the courts' findings on the exempt status of these positions
may not be dispositive for a similar job title.
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Sales
Representative239

Underwriter2 40

Table
Supervisor 241

Medical
Consultanf"

Domestic
Drayage
Coordinator24 3

Securities Broker 2 "

Dispatch
City
Supervisor-46

Recruiter247

Sales

Private
5
Investigator 24

Financial Anal1yst 248

C tfjai e r~

Game

Environt-ieital
Coordinator 0'

Insurance
Adjuster T

Accountait"

Claim

Network Operations
Engineer25 2

Staff Supervisor253

Plant Higinee&-

Director

0f

239.
[B9] Baum v. Astrazeneca LP, 372 F. App'x 246, 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2010).
240.
Whalen v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 569 F. Supp. 2d 327, 330-31 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
241.
Allen v. Harrah's Entm't Inc., No. 2:04 cv 128, 2006 WL 3513857, at *13 (N.D. Ind.
Dec. 4, 2006).
242. Harris v. Auxilium Pharm., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 711, 738-39 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
243. Carlson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., Nos. Civ.02-3780 JNE/JGL, Civ.02-4261
JNE/JGL, 2005 WL 758601, at *11, *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2005).
244. Hein v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
245. Mullins v. Target Corp., No. 09 C 7573, 2011 WL 1399262, at *1, *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13,
2011).
246. Perine v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1005, 1009, 1016 (C.D. Cal.

2006).
247.
2010).

Andrade v. Aerotek, Inc., No. CCB-08-2668, 2010 WL 4449333, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 5,

248. Paul v. UPMC Health Sys., No. 06-1565, 2009 WL 699943, at *1, *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
10,2009).
249. Haley v. Crittenden Cnty., No. 3:05 cv 00024 LUH, 2007 WL 1540263, at *1, *4 (E.D.
Ark. May 23, 2007).
250. Fairris v. City of Bessemer, 252 F. App'x 309, 310 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
251.
Talbert v. Am. Risk Ins. Co., 405 F. App'x 848, 854 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2010).
252. Bagwell v. Florida Broadband, LLC, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1317, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
253.
Goff v. Bayada Nurses, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818, 824 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
254. Allen v. Centillium Commc'ns, Inc., No. C-06-06153 (EDL), 2008 WL 916976, at *2-*3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
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Marketing/Business
___________

Office

Logistics
Specialist

Manager 258

57

Vice
Sales

Police Captain 2 s)~
_____________

Fire

District
Chiefs263

5

____________Development

Dispatcher""

U.,Inio~n Orgaizer-"'

President

Director

of
o

______________Investigations'6

Cyber
Manager64

Auction Rehabilitation
Specialist265

E-vnts Coord inaoi

_______________Specialist-"~

Chief Estimator2 69

2 9

Material
I Appraiser

Damage

Fair tblug Itk
Family Advocate 2 1
11

255. Johnston v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 3:08CV-33-DW, 2008 WL 4534109, at *1,
*42 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 7, 2008).
256. Bowers v. Foto-Wear, Inc., No. 3:CV-03-1137, 2007 WL 906417, at *1, *11 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 22, 2007).
257. Tuck v. Methanex Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1720-N, 2006 WL 6581525, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 29, 2006).
258. Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 203 F.3d 326, 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
259. Schwind v. EW & Assocs., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
260. Wright v. Monroe Cnty., No. 05-CV-6268T, 2007 WL 1434793, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May
14, 2007).
261. Savage v. UNITE HERE, No. 05 Civ. 10812(LTS)(DCF), 2008 WL 1790402, at *1, *10,
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008).
262. Stout v. Smolar, No. I:05-CV-1202-JOF, 2007 WL 2765519, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
18, 2007).
263. Monroe Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Monroe, 600 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (W.D. La. 2009).
264. Orr v. James D. Julia, Inc., No. 07-51-B-W, 2008 WL 2605569, at *1, *14 (D. Me. June
27, 2008).
265. Gillum v. ICF Emergency Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 08-314-C, 2010 WL 370338, at *1,
S11(M.D. La. Jan. 29, 2010).
266. Rock v. Ray Anthony Int'l, LLC, 380 F. App'x 875, 876 (1lth Cir. 2010).
267. Viola v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1980-T-23AEP, 2010 WL
5463080, at *1, *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2010).
268. O'Bryant v. City of Reading, 197 F. App'x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).
269. Weis v. Advanced Constr. Servs., No. Civ. A. 04-52, 2005 WL 2176829, at *1, *4 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 19, 2005).
270. Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., No. 04 CV 4051 DRH, 2006 WL 839443, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 29, 2006).
271. Hamby v. Associated Ctrs. for Therapy, 230 F. App'x 772, 773, 784 (10th Cir. 2007).
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School
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2 73
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Human
Commission
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Assistant 75
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_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __

School 27
Officer 1

Resource

2 76
Administrator

Ifme
ii.ip 1 ..- Nirsing "
Admninistrator'179

Tax Consultan 280

Industrial Property
Officer 28 1

Labor/Safety
Relations
28
Representative 2

Wastewater Treatment
Center Operator 283

Racing Official2

D.atabase

Plant

4

8

_________Administrator

Account Manager2 87 Manager 288
Marketing

Lead

Plaiiner

Work Customer

~

Training

Consultant'-6
of. Property Manager289

Services Adm Inistrative

Representative29

Assi stant 9

272. Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
273. Guerrero v. J.W. Hutton, Inc., 458 F.3d 830, 831, 832 (8th Cir. 2006).
274. See Mathews v. Bronger Masonry, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-478-SEB-DML, 2010 WL
4811914, at *1006, *1014 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 18, 2010).
275. Seltzer v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 288, 289, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
276. Rivera O'Bryant v. City of Reading, No. Civ.A.03-CV-06635, 2005 WL 1971882, at *2,
*16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2005).
277. Ferrell v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1339, 1340 (N.D. Ga.
2007).
278. Coleman-Edwards v. Simpson, No. 03-CV-3779 (DLI)(VVP), 2008 WL 820021, at *1,
* 11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).
279. Moon v. Ozark Health, Inc., No. 4:08 cv 00527 JLH, 2009 WL 737321, at *1, *2 (E.D.
Ark. Mar. 20, 2009).
280. Ho v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. C 05-04867 JF, 2008 WL 619029, at *3, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2008).
281. Jarvis v. Griffin, No. 6:08-cv-138-Orl-19KRS, 2009 WL 3064788, at *1, *4, *11 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 21, 2009).
282. Hazel v. Mich. State Emps. Ass'n, 826 F. Supp. 1096, 1098, 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
283. Beamer v. Possum Valley Mun. Auth., No. 1:06-cv-1982, 2010 WL 1253476, at *1, *13
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2010).
284. Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, Nos. 3:06-CV-128, 3:06-CV-129, 3:06CV-135, 2008 WL 153492, at *1, *9 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 14, 2008).
285. Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 933, 943,968 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
286. LaCourse v. GRS III LLC, No. 05-73613, 2006 WL 3694623, at *1, *20 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 13, 2006).
287. See Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2011).
288. Humann v. KEM Elec. Coop., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009, 1019 (D.N.D. 2006).
289. McKee v. CBF Corp., 299 F. App'x 426, 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2008).
290. Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 367, 376 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Community
Outreach 2 93

Supply

Chain

Business Analyst

294

Legislative Liaison

295

Associate

The miscellaneous nature of the administrative exemption is even
starker when juxtaposed against the executive exemption. The table
below reflects roughly eighty percent of the federal court decisions
reported in the seven-year window after the DOL's 2004 regulations that
found that the plaintiff qualified as an exempt executive employee. It
notes the job title and the number of decisions that ruled in favor of
exempt status. The list of job positions found to be exempt under the
executive exemption solidifies Harold Stein's
defining attribute of the
296
executive employee-managerial authority.
Store Manager
Assistant Manager
Police/Fire
Department
Chief/Captain/Lieutenant/Sergeant/Deputy
Production Supervisor
Center Manager

32
10
9

Shift Manager/Supervisor

3

Site Manager
Warehouse Manager/Supervisor
Director
Crew Leader
Superintendant
Project Man~ager
Night Manager
Branch Manager
Operations Manager
Area Manager

3
4
2

291.

5
3

2
1
I
1
1

Gonzales v. Barrett Bus. Servs., Inc., No. CV-05-0104-EFS, 2006 WL 1582380, at *1,

*21 (E.D. Wash. June 6, 2006).
292. Gofron v. Picsel Techs, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
293. Viola v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1980-T-23AEP, 2010 WL
5463080, at *1, *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2010).
294. Wolfslayer v. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-6709, 2005 WL 181913, at *1,
*11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2005).
295. Alberti v. Cnty. of Nassau, 393 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
296. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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The present regulations also demonstrate the expansive nature of
the "general business operations" language.2 97 They indicate that the
functional areas of a business in which an employee's duties
may fall so
298
as to relate to general business operations are far-ranging:
Tax
Accounting
Auditing
Quality control
Procurement
Marketing
Safety and health
Human resources
Labor relations
Government relations
Internet
and
administration

database

Finance
Budgeting
Insurance
Purchasing
Advertising
Research
Personnel management
Employee benefits
Public relations
Computer network
Legal and regulatory compliance

These functional areas arguably cover every department of a
modern company's operations. And they are not even exhaustive. The
regulations make clear that these comprehensive areas are merely
illustrative. It can be stretched to include many other sorts of "similar
299
activities."
But even within each of these functional areas, there are copious
duties that an employee can carry out that qualify as being involved with
the general business operations. In 1949, Harry Weiss concluded that
duties that directly relate to general business operations include
"advising the management, planning, negotiating, representing the
company, purchasing, promoting sales, and business research and
control., 300 The DOL echoed these responsibilities as typical of exempt
work under the administrative exemption.30 ' In fact, former 29 C.F.R. §
541.205(b), which was in place until the 2004 regulations, contained all
of these functions as examples of work directly related to general
297. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b) (2011).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Weiss Report, supra note 44, at 63.
301. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,138 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
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business operations. °2 Although this regulatory language is no longer in
place, courts continue to rely upon these specific examples in holding
303
that employees are exempt under the administrative exemption.
The regulations further expand the field of duties that relate to
general business operations. Two of the occupations that have been
frequently litigated under the administrative exemption are insurance
claims adjusters and financial services employees. 304 The regulations
identify the duties carried out by these two categories of professionals
that bring them within the ambit of the administrative exemption. 30 5 The
breadth of the duties demonstrates the diverse functions an employee can
perform to qualify as an administrative employee.

Insurance Claims Adjusters3
Inspecting property damage

Interviewing insureds, witnesses,
and physicians
making
and
Evaluating
regarding
recommendations
coverage of claims
recommendations
Making
regarding litigation
Negotiating settlements

Determining liability
value of a claim

and total

Reviewing factual information to
prepare damage estimates

FinancialI Scrvices Lmployees
and
analyzing
Collecting
the
regarding
information
assets,
income,
customer's
investments, or debts
Advising the customer regarding
and
advantages
the
of
different
disadvantages
financial products

financial
which
Determining
products best meet the customer's
needs and financial circumstances
Marketing, servicing, or promoting
the employer's financial products

302. 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(b) (2002).
303. See, e.g., Sanfratello v. Howell Tractor & Equip., LLC, No. 2:09-CV-162, 2011 WL
2965541, at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 20, 2011); Gorey v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 200,
206 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); McCumber v. Eye Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. Civ.A. 09-1000, 2011 WL
1542671, at *10 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2011); Henry v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 04-CV-40346, 2009
WL 3270771, at *13 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2009).
304. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.203 (2011).
305. See id.
306. § 541.203(a).
307. § 541.203(b).
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Courts across the country similarly extend a wide radius around the
types of activities that may not directly relate to management per se, but
that directly relate to general business operations. A sampling from
several circuits follows below, showing the job positions and the duties
that the courts focused on in determining that the employees qualified as
exempt administrative employees.
The First Circuit has held, as a matter of law, that the administrative
exemption may include customer relations managers, auction managers,
sales managers, and police lieutenants." 8

First Circuit
New Purchase/Customer
Relations Manager 30 9

"Cyber
Manager 310

Auction"

Sales Manager 311

Police Lieutenant 312

Worked with other departments to ensure
that products were properly outfitted and
delivered; instructed the Service Manager
concerning what needed to be done if
parts were not installed; stayed in contact
with the customers to make sure that they
were happy; coordinated with various
departments to ensure that customers were
satisfied with their purchase
Developed relationships with potential
clients; conducted research relating to the
authenticity and value of the goods;
evaluated items for inclusion in an auction
Convinced clients to book events;
responded
to
individualized client
concerns; answered questions while
touring the properties with clients;
determined how to pitch the venues
Scheduled training for subordinates;
supervised other officers; oversaw and
supervised the issuance of search warrants
directed staff to carry out the warrants;
acted as the internal affairs investigator;

308. See infra text accompanying notes 310-13.
309. Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680, 685-86 (1st Cir. 2007).
310. Orr v. James D. Julia, Inc., No. 07-51-B-W, 2008 WL 2605569, at *1, *13-14 (D. Me.
June 27, 2008).
311. See Hines v. Longwood Events, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1 1653-PBS, 2010 WL 2573194, at *3,
*8, *9 (D. Mass. June 23, 2010).
312. Rooney v. Town of Groton, 577 F. Supp. 2d 513, 533 (D. Mass. 2008).
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First Circuit,

complaints;
handled
community
disciplined employees; assisted in the new
hire and promotion process; represented
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

The Eleventh Circuit has held, as a matter of law, that the
administrative exemption may include hotel managers, 1property
3
administrators, community outreach associates, and estimators.?

Eleventh Circuit
Store Manager 314

Directed and supervised her assistants'
work; scheduled their work; recommended
the hiring and firing of employees; made
the decisions about what work could be
delegated to assistant managers and what
work she needed to do herself-, trained new
the
store's
balanced
employees;
checkbook; ensured deposits were made

Director
Investigations 31 5

of Interviewed
witnesses;
inspected
automobile accident sites; reviewed
information from accidents to determine

Hotel Manager3 1 6

what evidence needed to be preserved and
whether expert witnesses would be
necessary
Oversaw the work of all staff members;
trained and managed subordinate staff;
scheduled working shifts of staff and
security officers; managed overtime hours;
hired hotel housekeepers and maintenance
employees; disciplined subordinates; was
responsible for the quality of hotel
services; handled all cash transactions; was
responsible for payroll and budgeting;

313. See infra text accompanying notes 315-21.
314. Bosch v. Title Max, Inc., No. CIV.A.03-AR-0463-S, 2005 WL 357411, at *6 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 7, 2005).
315. Stout v. Smolar, No. 1:05-CV-1202-JOF, 2007 WL 2765519, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18,
2007).

316.

Moody v. Intown Suites Mgmt., Inc., No. Civ.A.1:04CV1 198-TWT, 2006 WL 870388, at

* 1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2006).
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Eleventh Circuit
Property Administrator;
Property
Industrial
Officer;
Property
Management Specialist 3 17

Community
Associate3 18

Outreach

managed all guest conflicts and evictions
for violations of hotel rules and policies
transfers
of
property;
Processed
investigated losses; audited contractors;
signed transfers of property; relieved
contractors from liability; served as "focal
point" for all contracts with contractoraccountable government property; directed
of a trainee; interpreted
activities
regulations; offered advice regarding
compliance
Involved in developing, planning, and
implementing strategies designed to
promote brand; networked; acted as the
"face" of employer in the market

Estimator 319

Prepared bids that were necessary for
employer to sell and/or produce their
product

Network
Engineer3 20

Operations

Developed and improved network system
to make it function reliably; wrote
for wireless
network
specifications
topology; wrote specifications for routers
and switches used in network; designed
and assured proper installation; maintained
security;
network
availability
and
interacted with clients for support;
consulted with clients for design and
technical specifications; interacted with
vendors for pricing and availability of
materials; scheduled technical field staff
installations;
for
surveys
and
recommended purchases of network
equipment,

evaluated

emerging

317. Jarvis v. Griffin, No. 6:08-cv-138-Orl-19KRS, 2009 WL 3064788, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
21, 2009).
318. Viola v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1980-T-23AEP, 2010 WL
5463080, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2010).
319. Carlos Reyes v. Hollywood Woodwork, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1291 (S.D. Fla.
2005).
320. Bagwell v. Fla. Broadband, LLC, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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Eleventh Circuit,.

technologies, handled customer problems
and complaints; assigned work to field
technician;, solved problems with the
network

The Second Circuit has held, as a matter of law, that the
administrative exemption may include underwriters, budget examiners,
school principals, and union organizers.3 2 l
Second Circuit

Underwriter 322

_______________

______

Reviewed applications and recommending
whether loans should be accepted or rejected

Budget
Examiner 323

Prepared
spending
projections;
analyzed
expenditures; controlled spending; approved
purchases
School Principal 324 Analyzed the results of standardized tests to
determine which subject areas teachers needed to
focus on; worked with teachers create lessons;
interviewed and supervised teachers; made hiring
and
firing
recommendations;
developed
recruitment
strategy; met with parents;
supervised custodial staff; proposed budgets;
proposed teacher salaries
Executive
Arranged travel; scheduled appointments; took
Assistant 325
care of executive's personal checking account;
completed expense reports
Senior Specialist to Responded to client research requests; created
the
Emerging investment summaries; coordinated client events,
Europe
Middle meetings, and conferences; organized the content
East and Africa of road shows; communicated with attendees
Desk3 26
concerning schedules; hosted clients; resolved
321.

See infra text accompanying notes 323-28.

322. Havey v. Homebound Mortg., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-313, 2005 WL 1719061, at *5 (D. Vt.
July 21, 2005).
323. Alberti v. Cnty. of Nassau, 393 F. Supp. 2d 151, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
324. Coleman-Edwards v. Simpson, No. 03-CV-3779 (DLI)(VVP), 2008 WL 820021, at * 1011 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).

325. Seltzer v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
326. Krause v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2603(RMB), 2011
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Union Organizer

327

[Vol. 29:2

problems clients had
Recruited members to union; "was the face of the
union for numerous UNITE members and
unorganized workers"; represented union and its
goals to the community and customers

The Seventh Circuit has held, as a matter of law, that the
administrative exemption may include table game supervisors, warrant
administrators, law specialists, account managers, and investigators. 328

Seventh Circuit
Game
Table
Supervisors 329

Service
Assistant
Manager/ Warranty
Administrator 330

Office Manager 331

Law Specialist

332

Issued "service recoveries" and "comps" to
casino customers; identified odd behavior or
irregularities at the gaming tables; warned,
and
recommended
coached,
counseled,
discipline of other employees
Developed quotes for customers; tracked
progress of projects; assigned service
technicians; determine if equipment was under
warranty; assisted in resolving warranty
disputes
Conducted bookkeeping; worked to make
certain processes within the company "more
efficient;" acted as employer's representative in
outside
with the
company's
dealings
accountants and third party vendors; had
authority to stamp checks on behalf of the
company
Spoke to outside counsel; made notes of
conversations she had with insureds and
counsel; consulted with her supervisors;
performed legal research relating directly to her

WL 1453791, at *5, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,2011).
327. Savage v. UNITE HERE, No. 05 Civ. 10812(LTS)(DCF), 2008 WL 1790402, at *8, *11
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008).
328. See infra text accompanying notes 330-36.
329. Allen v. Harrah's Entm't Inc., No. 2:04 cv 128, 2006 WL 3513857, at *11, *13 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 4, 2006).
330. Sanfratello v. Howell Tractor and Equip., LLC, No. 2:09-CV-162., 2011 WL 2965541,
at *6-*8 (N.D. Ind. July 20, 2011).
331. Mathews v. Bronger Masonry, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1013-14 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
332. Austin v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 240 F.R.D. 420,423,429,431 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
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Account Manager 33 3

Investigator 334

Traffic
Control
Superintendent 335

cases and to other matters; authorized
settlements and created report summaries;
handled third-party lawsuits brought against
employer's policyholders
Acted as intermediary between employees and
software developers; trained staff of customers;
answered questions and explained answers to
the customer; teaching customer how to
implement answers to questions; identified
customers' needs; assisted customers in
implementing solution
Analyzed data submitted by stores; identified
possible investigations of theft; conducted
investigations; evaluated strategies for the
investigation; interviewed informants and
suspects
Instructed subordinates; determined allocation
of personnel for vehicle and crowd control
during special events and emergencies;
approved the creation of subordinates'
schedules and approved requests for time off,
surveyed areas of assignment "to make sure that
there [are] no glitches"; arranged for lunch and
restroom breaks; prepared for and changed
configuration of street closures; determined
how and whether to move traffic aides
depending on conditions

Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held, as a matter of law, that the
administrative exemption may include systems engineers, city
dispatchers, customer service representatives, and project engineers.336

333. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2011).
334. Mullins v. Target Corp., No. 09 C 7573, 2011 WL 1399262, at *1, *2, *3, *8 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 13, 2011).
335. Conroy v. City of Chicago, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064, 1068-70 (N.D. I11.2009).
336. See infra text accompanying notes 338-343.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

Ninth Circu~it__________________
Systems
Administrator/Engineer

337

City Dispatcher 338
Customer
Representative 339

Services

Accounting Staff 4 °

On-Job Supervisor3 4 1

Served as employer's representative to
outside entities; ensured that employer's
software was compatible and complied
with network protocols; recommended
changes to the client's hardware
systems; coordinated and directed work
among
subordinates;
determined
schedules; monitored the status of its
projects; engaged in problem-solving;
provided solutions for client's technical
issues; served as "point man" for all
technical issues; met with clients and
advised them on best practices
Coordinated drivers' routes for pickup
of freight
Conducted background checks on job
applicants; conducted skills evaluations
of job applicants; hired temporary
employees; disciplined and terminated
temporary employees when problems
arose;
distributed
and
provided
instruction to temporary workers on
their time card procedures; produced
temporary workers work schedules and
locations
Researched tax issues; reviewed the Tax
Code; "translated complex tax issues
into plain English for clients who did
not have the tax expertise he did";
reviewed and analyzed legal cases;
worked directly clients
Studied and observed new delivery

337. Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938-41, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
338. Perine v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1005, 1008-09, 1016 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
339. Gonzales v. Barrett Bus. Servs., Inc., No. CV-05-0104-EFS, 2006 WL 1582380, at *1,
*21 (E.D. Wash. June 6, 2006).
340. Ho v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. C 05-04867 JF, 2008 WL 619029, at *3, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2008).
341. Lopez v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C 08-05396 SI, 2010 WL 3630619, at *1, *2, *4

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/6

50

Bertagna: The "Miscellaneous Employee": Exploring the Boundaries of the Fai

2012]

THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE"

Ninth Circuit

Proj ect Engineer 311

routes to evaluate their efficiency;
trained drivers on how to improve their
accuracy, efficiency, and safety; studied
maps of package delivery routes; rode
with delivery drivers to observe the
routes; participated in meetings and
offered suggestions for improving the
routes
Communicated owners about specific
projects; signed subcontracts on behalf
of employer; signed change orders;
directed the work of employee;
determined the number of employees
needed at a job-site; determined the
hours worked; scheduled the work;
created
the
project
schedules;
sequenced the work; assisted with
preparing monthly cost analyses;
ensured compliance with required
plans; along assisted with margin
analyses on specific projects; ensured
that projects met specifications; ensured
that projects on which he worked stayed
under budget

No administrative employee is going to carry out all the tasks
identified above. Nor can an administrative employee possibly work in
all the functional areas identified above. Only the highest-level
executives at a business would be involved in such a vast range of
functions.
Judge Posner agrees. In a recent decision, Judge Posner, after
noting that the plaintiff-account manager was the "picture perfect
example of a worker for whom the Act's overtime provision is not
intended," 343 held that the plaintiff was an exempt administrative
employee, even though he did not perform certain functions that the

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010).

342. Black v.Colaska Inc.,
No.C07-823JLR., 2008 WL 4681567, at *1, *9, *10 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 20, 2008).
343. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2011).
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344
regulations identify as illustrative of an administrative employee.
Judge Posner suggested that such a result is the only logical result,
stating that "below the highest executive level a modem business is a
congeries of specialists," and the plaintiff could not have performed his
exempt duties had he also been carrying out other exempt administrative
duties.345
In conclusion, as early as 1940, the administrative exemption
embraced a class of employees that was so vast and so diverse that it
essentially defied definition.
Harold Stein, the architect of the
administrative exemption, posited that drawing a "dividing line"
between exempt and nonexempt administrative employees was nearly
impossible without the vital restraint of salary level. 346 With the erosion
of that primary divider under the new regulations, as well as the
proliferation of the service sector and evolution of the American
economy, that class of miscellaneous employees only continued to swell.

D. Administrative/ProductionWorker Dichotomy
Courts have attempted to answer the administrative exemption's
complexity with a simple solution in what is referred to as the
"administrative/production worker dichotomy," an analytical tool
conceived to clarify the meaning of work "directly related to the
management policies or general business operations. 347 The dichotomy
is "aconcept that has an industrial age genesis. ' ' 348 Accordingly, it is
best illustrated with a scene that resonates with the factory-focused
economy from which it sprang: "The typical example of the...
dichotomy is a factory setting where the 'production' employees work
on the line running machines, while the administrative employees work
349
in an office communicating with the customers and doing paperwork.
While the dichotomy is intended to simplify, it is actually fraught
with peril- particularly in cases outside the manufacturing context in
which the dichotomy arose.

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 982-83.
Id. at 983.
See Stein Report, supranote 30, at 25.
Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 872 (7th Cir. 2008).
Shaw v. Prentice Hall Computer Publ'g, Inc., 151 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1998).
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1. Dispositive or Discretionary?
First, the weight to be accorded the dichotomy is uncertain. On one
hand, the Second Circuit has befriended a position that arguably treats
35 °
the dichotomy as dispositive. In Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
the court of appeals' administrative exemption analysis turned
exclusively upon the dichotomy, leading to its conclusion that the
plaintiffs-underwriters were not exempt because they "produce the
services-loans-that are 'sold' by the business to produce its income. 3 5'
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has exhibited its willingness to
devalue the dichotomy where it does not appear to be analogous to the
occupation at hand. In Roe-Midgett v. CC Services, Inc., 352 the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the dichotomy was "not terribly useful" to
analyzing the exempt status of claims adjusters because they were
"obviously neither working on a manufacturing line nor 'producing'
anything in the literal sense. 353 In its 2004 regulations, the DOL itself
made an effort to 354deemphasize the dichotomy's importance to the
exemption analysis.
2. Broad or Narrow?
Second, the meaning and scope of the terms "production" and
"administrative" are unclear. The formula is intended to be simple:

350. 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009).
351. Id. at 534, 537.
352. Roe-Midgett, 512 F.3d at 865.
353. Id. at 872-73; see also Shaw, 151 F.3d at 644 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the test but
noting it may be "no longer... helpful" in every context); In re RBC Dain Rauscher Overtime
Litig., 703 F. Supp. 2d 910, 934 (D. Minn. 2010) ("The Court finds the production/administrative
dichotomy similarly unhelpful in assessing whether securities brokers-particularly those who work
for an employer that engages in the business of providing financial services, rather than providing
particular investment products-are engaged in work that is directly related to management or
general business operations of the employer or its customers").
354. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,141 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 541) ("The Department's view that the 'production versus staff' dichotomy has always
been illustrative-but not dispositive-of exempt status is supported by federal case law"). The
California Supreme Court recently issued its first commentary on the dichotomy, where it reversed a
court of appeal decision that had relied dispositively upon the dichotomy. Harris v. Superior Court,
53 Cal. 4th 170, 175, 183 (2011). The California Supreme Court criticized the court of appeal for its
"overreliance" on the dichotomy. Id. at 182-83. It ruled that courts, in determining whether an
employee qualifies under the administrative exemption, should conduct an inquiry that turns on the
particular facts of the case rather than relying upon the oversimplified tool of the dichotomy. See id.
at 190.
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employees who do "production" work are covered by the FLSA; those
who perform "administrative" work are not.355 Growing out of a
factory-driven economy, the dichotomy's original vision of "production"
work understandably would have encompassed work dealing directly
with a tangible good. But as the nation's economy has evolved into one
driven by service-oriented businesses, courts "have adopted and
modified its logic to less traditional 'production' situations. ,,356 As the
Second Circuit has noted of the dichotomy, "context matters. 357
As the dichotomy has been modified to keep up with modem
circumstances, the concept of "production" has become increasingly
fluid. For example, in holding that racing officials' duties were not
directly related to the general business operations of a racetrack
operator, the Fourth Circuit characterized the racetrack operator as
"produc[ing]" live horse races to place the officials on the production
side of the dichotomy.3 58 In another example, the Second Circuit,
applying the dichotomy, held that state police officers were not exempt
administrative employees because their "primary function" was to
"'produce' . . . criminal investigations., 359 Thus, it has been stretched to
fit so many types of "products" that "production" arguably swallows any
good or service that an employer provides, placing virtually every
business activity on the "production" side of the dichotomy. 360 Further,
even if employees may not actually "produce" the employer's primary
good or service, courts may still place them in "production" if their work
"concerns" 361 or is "related" to the employer's production work.362 The
line, therefore, marking the distinction between "production" and
"administrative" is a fuzzy one that renders suspect the viability of this
355. See 29 C.F.R. 541.201(a) (2005). In addition, the DOL has long applied a modified
version of the dichotomy when the business is a retail or service establishment, in which case the
dichotomy draws a line between "administrative" and "sales" work. See Martin v. Cooper Elec.
Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing former 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a)); see also Davis
v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529, 531-32 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Employment may thus be
classified as belonging in the administrative category, which falls squarely within the administrative
exception, or as production/sales work, which does not").
356. See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC., 564 F.3d 688, 694 (4th Cir. 2009).
357. Davis, 587 F.3d at 536.
358. Desmond, 564 F.3d at 694-95.
359. Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other
grounds by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
360. See, e.g., Webster v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash., Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting the plaintiffs characterization of the defendant's business and application of the
dichotomy, stating that under the plaintiff's approach, "any work-including that of a president or
CEO-... would be production" and "would defeat the purpose of the administrative exemption").
361. See Davis, 587 F.3d at 534.
362. See Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
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363
"tool" in the modem era.

3. Judicial or Business Decision?
Finally, the dichotomy inserts the court into a position that it is not
qualified to fill. In certain contexts, courts around the country have
recognized that "[c]ourts may not sit as super personnel departments,
assessing the merits-or even the rationality---of employers'...
business decisions. 364 In light of how the dichotomy has developed,
however, courts effectively make business judgments by telling
businesses what their primary product or service is, with the outcome of
the dichotomy analysis turning on how the court characterizes the
entity's primary business or mission.
The abundant litigation involving pharmaceutical
sales
representatives is illustrative. In In re Novartis Wage and Hour
Litigation,"' the district court defined the pharmaceutical company's
products as "the pharmaceutical drugs that it researches, develops, and
manufactures. 36 6 As a result, it decided that the company's sales
representatives were not production workers because they had "nothing
to do with producing [the company's] drugs. 367 Yet, in Ruggeri v.
BoehringerIngelheim Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,368 a district court from the
same circuit defined the pharmaceutical company's product
differently. 369
It characterized the company's product as "the
manufacture and sale of pharmaceuticals., 370 With sales being included
in the definition of the company's product, the district court could not
363. Numerous courts have declined to apply the dichotomy, characterizing it as obsolete. See,
e.g., McLaughlin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02-6205-TC, 2004 WL 1857112, at *4-5 (D.
Or. Aug. 18, 2004) (refusing to apply an "outdated line of reasoning"); Robinson-Smith v. Gov.
Emps. Ins. Co. 323 F. Supp. 2d 12, 22-23 n.6 (D.D.C. 2004) (refusing to analyze the issue "under
an outmoded line of reasoning").
364. Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991); see also DeJamette v.
Coming, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that a court "does not sit as a kind of superpersonnel department weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by firms charged with
employment discrimination"); Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
a court does "not sit as a super-personnel department over employers scrutinizing and secondguessing every decision they make"); Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11 th
Cir. 1991) (noting that federal courts do not sit "as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity's business decisions").
365. 593 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
366.
Id. at 655.
367. Id.
368. 585 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Conn. 2008).
369. See id. at 273.
370. Id. (emphasis added).
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hold that its sales representatives fell on the administrative side of the
" ' Thus, with
dichotomy.37
a slight shift in how the court characterized
the employer's business, it completely altered the boundary of the
dichotomy and the outcome of the employees' exempt status under the
administrative exemption.
In brief, the dichotomy has fostered a lexiconic sleight of hand.
Each party has an incentive to manipulate the characterization of the
defendant's business to impact the scope of the "administrative" and
"production" legs of the dichotomy. In the end, a judge-one with a
limited history and familiarity with the employer's business modeldictates to the employer what its primary good or service is that it
provides to the public.372
In light of the foregoing, it is unsurprising that courts have
characterized the dichotomy as "an imperfect analytical tool"' 37 3 that is
"only useful by analogy in the modem service-industry context"--or in
some cases, "not terribly useful" at all. 374 At bottom, the dichotomy's
usefulness at solving the mystery of the exemption's ambiguous
"general business operations" language is questionable.
E. A FallbackExemption
With the wide ambit of duties attached to the "general business
operations" language, the administrative exemption serves as an
effective supplemental or alternative exemption for employers.

371. Id. at 273-74.
372. See, e.g., Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 872-73 (7th Cir. 2008)
(providing an example of a plaintiff characterizing the business of the defendant in a manner that
was favorable for them on the dichotomy analysis, which the court rejected); see also Foster v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (illustrating the plaintiff and
defendant's contrasting efforts to characterize the nature of the employer's primary business and
employee's primary duty). The analysis of what constitutes the employer's primary business
becomes even more complicated when the employer is hired by other companies to provide a
service. See, e.g., Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 738 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903-04 (D. Minn. 2010)
(holding that the plaintiffs' work was directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer, as their duties were ancillary to the primary business of the defendant's
clients).
373. Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC., 564 F.3d 688, 694 (4th Cir. 2009).
374. Roe-Midgett, 512 F.3d at 872. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that it should be used
"only to the extent it clarifies the analysis." Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("Only when work falls 'squarely on the 'production' side of the line,' has the
administration/production dichotomy been determinative"); see also Kohl v. Woodlands Fire Dep't,
440 F. Supp. 2d 626, 636 (S.D. Tex. 2006) ("The analytic difficulty of applying the
'production/administration' distinction has led some courts to question whether the dichotomy is
analytically helpful in the context of modem service industries").
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Employers appear to be appreciating the value of this tool. Between
2004 and 2011, a merits decision was reached in nearly three hundred
federal court cases regarding the exempt status of the plaintiff under the
administrative exemption.37 5 In a strong majority of those cases, the
administrative exemption was joined with another FLSA exemption.
Employers, therefore, are evidently recognizing the value of the
administrative exemption as an important alternative in the event that
another (and perhaps, more obvious) exemption fails.
Employers typically seek and hope for a ruling that an employee
qualifies as exempt under one of several exemptions. But in the event
that one or more exemptions fail, the tremendous breadth of the
administrative exemption provides employers with a formidable defense.
In Coppage v. Bradshaw,76 an insurance agency's State Managing
Director sought overtime compensation under the FLSA.377 The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment, with the employer arguing that the
employee was exempt under the outside sales and administrative
exemptions.378 The district court denied the employer's motion on the
outside sales exemption, holding there were issues of fact as to whether
the plaintiffs primary duty was making sales (even though the employee
had sold one hundred thirty products to eighty-eight clients in his few
years with the company). 379 The district court, however, granted
summary judgment to the employer on the ground that the employee was
exempt as an administrative employee.380
In Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., 381 a putative class of systems
consultants, business consultants, and technical consultants sued a
software development company under the FLSA.382 On the employer's
motion for summary judgment, the district court succinctly concluded
that there was conflicting evidence on whether certain employees
actually wrote computer code, an essential element of the computer
professional exemption. 383 However, the district court held that the
plaintiffs "squarely" fell within the administrative exemption and
granted summary judgment to the employer.384

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See supra text accompanying note 96.
665 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1363, 1365.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1367-69.

381.

764 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Minn. 2011).

382.
383.
384.

Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1069-71.
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Finally, in Renfro v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 385 a putative
class of technical writers and nuclear specialists filed an FLSA lawsuit
against the operator of a nuclear powered generating station.38 6 The
district court denied summary judgment to the employer on the learned
professional exemption, pointing to evidence that certain nuclear
specialists did not have college degrees and had acquired most of their
knowledge on the job, in contrast to obtaining it "by a prolonged course
of specialized intellectual instruction., 387 However, the district court
held that the nuclear specialists qualified as administrative employees,
finding that they assisted with running the nuclear plant and exercising
discretion and independent judgment in important matters.388
In all three of these cases, other FLSA exemptions likely appeared
to be the go-to exemption for the occupations involved. An employer
would likely look first to the outside sales exemption for an employee
who sells insurance products, the computer professional exemption for
an employee assisting a computer software company, and the learned
professional exemption for an employee running a nuclear plant. In all
three cases, however, these exemptions fell short under the facts of the
cases. And in all three cases, the administrative exemption's scope
allowed it to fill in the gaps that the other exemptions could not, securing
the employees' exempt status under the FLSA.
F. CombinationExemption
When an employee's duties do not fit neatly into the administrative
exemption, or the employee performs administrative duties but not in the
quantum necessary to constitute the employee's "primary" duty, the socalled "combination exemption" serves as an alternative haven of relief.
This exemption provides the following:
Employees who perform a combination of exempt duties as set forth in
the regulations in this part for executive, administrative, professional,
outside sales and computer employees may qualify for exemption.
Thus, for example, an employee whose primary duty involves a
combination of exempt administrative work and exempt executive
work may qualify for exemption. In other words, work that is exempt
under one section of this part will not defeat the exemption under any
385.
386.
387.
388.

No. 1:99-cv-877, 2005 WL 4882704 (W.D.Mich. Jan. 25, 2005).
Id.at*l.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *11-12, *14.
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other section.

389

In brief, the combination exemption creates the ability to blend the
exempt duties from distinct exemptions for purposes of satisfying the
primary duties test. To invoke this exemption, the employer must
demonstrate that (1) the employee engages in several types of exempt
work; that (2) one type of work alone does not constitutes the
employee's primary duty; and that (3) all of the exempt work taken
together comprises the employee's primary duty. 390 "Thus, an employee
performing duties that fall under more than one individual exemption,
none of which separately represents her primary duty, may be exempt
under the combination exemption if those duties, when combined,
constitute her primary duty. 3 91 For example, "an employee whose
primary duty is neither management nor administration may fall under a
combination exemption
based upon his administrative and management
392
responsibilities. ,
The combination exemption does not necessarily ease the employer
of its affirmative burden to establish exempt status. To satisfy the
combination exemption with an employee who performs administrative
duties, the employer must show that the employer meets the duties test
of each individual exemption; the only burden that is alleviated is that
the employee's393administrative duties need not be the employee's
"primary duty."
But when satisfied- this hybrid exemption can serve as a potent tool
for employers seeking to prove the exempt status of their employees,
either as a basis for bolstering the exempt status that applies or serving
as a backup for the exempt status that is vulnerable. In Schmidt v. Eagle
Waste & Recycling, Inc.,394 for example, a sales representative for a
waste removal company was responsible for attracting new customers,
as well as maintaining the business of existing customers.395 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the employee
satisfied the outside sale exemption: her job was to solicit new
customers, which she customarily and regularly did away from the office
and without direct supervision.396
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

29 C.F.R. § 541.708 (2011).
Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1232 (5th Cir. 1990).
IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 2007).
Auer v. Robbins, 65 F.3d 702, 722 (8th Cir. 1995).
See IntraComm, 492 F.3d at 294.
599 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Schmidt Appeal].
Id.at 629.
Id.at 628-29; see also Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 928,
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The district court did not stop with the outside sales exemption. It
further concluded that even if sales were not the plaintiffs primary duty,
the employee would still have been exempt under the combination
exemption. 397 "To the extent plaintiffs work was not 'sales,' it was
'administrative,"' such that "nearly all of the time plaintiff worked for
defendant she was involved in exempt work under the FLSA. ' ' 398 The
Seventh Circuit agreed on both the outside sales and combination
exemptions, affirming the grant of summary judgment to the
employer.399
The combination exemption provides the icing on the cake of the
extraordinary scope of the administrative exemption. If the employee's
duties do not fall within one of the virtually unlimited functional areas or
exempt categories of activities that are directly related to the employer's
general business operations, this hybrid exemption stands ready to fill in
the gaps for the employee whose duties do not quite fit within the
elusive exemption.
V. CONCLUSION

In his 1949 report, Harry Weiss commented on the Wage and Hour
Division's "little, if any, experience" with the administrative exemption
at the time of the FLSA's enactment in 1938.400 He conceded that the
newly created agency could not comprehend the "full implications" of
the novel exemption at that moment in time.4 ° '
The Wage and Hour Division, and federal courts and litigants alike,
should appreciate the implications of the administrative exemption
seventy years later. Between 1900 and 1938, there were fewer than fifty
reported federal decisions reaching a decision on the merits of the
administrative exemption. 402
In the seven years following the
promulgation of the 2004 regulations, the number was closer to three
hundred reported decisions.40 3 The rapidly growing reliance upon the
administrative exemption demonstrates the relevance of this exemption
today and the importance of grasping its limits.

935- 36 (W.D. Wis. 2009).
397. Id. at 937.
398. Id.
399. Schmidt Appeal, 599 F.3d at 633.
400. See Weiss Report, supra note 44, at 54.
401. See id.
402. See supratext accompanying note 192.
403. See supratext accompanying note 96.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/6

60

Bertagna: The "Miscellaneous Employee": Exploring the Boundaries of the Fai

2012]

THE "MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEE"

545

The FLSA's exemptions were likely intended to carve out
reasonably narrow and clearly defined categories of workers that fell
outside the FLSA's wage-and-hour protections. But the vague and
expansive character of the administrative exemption has distorted the
definition of an administrative employee to such an extent that the
exemption has swallowed the other exemptions, and arguably, the
FLSA. With paychecks and unemployment rates suffering, employers
and employees are likely to seek protection in the elusive shade of this
Unless Congress and the courts can undertake a
exemption.
comprehensive overhaul of the administrative exemption, however, both
groups of litigants will likely tread along a continued path of confusion
and uncertainty.
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